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1. Introduction 
In 2004, on a rooftop in the Iraqi city of Najaf, a group of U.S. Marines became 
involved in heavy fighting as they tried to repel off an attack on the local Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) office, conducted by several hundred insurgents. The 
U.S. Marines were supported by a group of men employed by Blackwater Security, a 
U.S. based Private Security Company (PSC) contracted to secure representatives of 
the CPA and its property in Iraq. As the fighting prolonged, Blackwater Security 
helicopters airlifted supplies to the soldiers and the PSC employees, and evacuated 
one of the wounded U.S. Marines (Priest 2004)1. The Najaf incident exemplifies the 
capacity and resources held by a kind of non-state actor that has gotten increased 
attention, especially after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, but that is often believed to 
have started to develop from the end of the Cold War (Singer 2003).  
Despite of the growth of the Private Military and Security industries, and their 
involvement in security provision world wide, it is today still commonly accepted 
that “coercive power still resides within states” (Avant 2005: 1). Furthermore, the 
ability states have to monopolize violence is seen as tightly connected to whether it 
should be considered sovereign or not (Mandel 2002:  30). Monopolization of 
legitimate force has also been connected to the ability states have to provide security 
for its citizens (Rotberg 2004: 3). From these points of view, a state monopoly on 
legitimate force is still viewed as an important facet of state relations, both on the 
domestic and the international stage. Indeed, those favoring the state as the core 
producer of this public good, argue that privatization of security might endanger the 
state’s ability to exercise control and weaken the democratic process surrounding the 
use of violence (Avant 2005: 4). It has also been argued that hardliners and profit 
motives will be given more weight than state interests (ibid.). A consequence 
following when states open up for the involvement of PSCs and Private Military 
                                              
1 http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Wash_Post-Private_guards.html 
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Companies (PMCs) in the sphere where security is produced, can therefore be that 
the position of the state as a monopolist on legitimate force is challenged (Singer 
2003: 18). The United States (US) for its part is a remarkable case here. In fact, the 
US has used PMCs or PSCs in every larger military operation since the end of the 
Cold War (Singer 2003: 16). This is illustrated by the fact that US based PSCs was 
awarded $300 billion worth of contracts from the Department of Defense (DOD) 
between 1994 and 2002 (Avant 2005: 8; Singer 2003: 15). The US also has a history 
of relying on private solutions in the military sphere even before the end of the Cold 
War. During the Second World War, Japanese forces captured 1150 contractors 
working for Morrison-Knudson Corporation alongside the US Marines Forces 
stationed on the Wake Island (Kidwell 2005: 1). After the end of the Cold War, the 
US has on occasions used PSCs and PMCs as proxies in order to reach foreign 
political goals. On the Balkans, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) 
was hired by the US to train Croat and Bosnian forces in the 1990s (Avant 2005: 153; 
Singer 2003: 124-130). The US has also hired PSCs and PMCs to assist the US “Plan 
Colombia” supporting Colombia in its anti drug war (Singer: 132-133). During 
Operation Dessert Storm in 1991, the military operation aimed at throwing out Iraqi 
forces of Kuwait, 1 of 50 men deployed belonged to a PMC or PSC (Østerud 2005: 
79). 12 years later, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1 of 10 deployed men was a 
contractor (ibid.). The following occupation of Iraq after the 2003 military campaign, 
toppling the regime in Baghdad led several US agencies, departments and parts of its 
armed forces to contract out support and supply tasks to a wide array of PSCs and 
PMCs to fulfill tasks related to intelligence collection, security provision and supply 
services (Isenberg 2006b: 6; Leander 2004). Hence, the US not only has a long 
history of allowing PSCs and PMCs to operate within their security structures, but it 
has also responded to foreign political challenges by using these actors. The extensive 
use of PSCs and PMCs in the US has offered these companies an important role in 
the sphere of security production, an area that it is commonly agreed that the state 
should be able to claim a monopoly on. Hence, the practice of allowing PSCs and 
PMCs to operate within the security providing structures of the state can be said to 
represent a challenge to the perception that the US is a monopolist on legitimate 
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force. The aim of this thesis is thus to investigate how the use of PSCs and PMCs 
affect strong states monopoly on legitimate force, using the US as a case. 
1.1 The research question 
To investigate the consequences of the use of PSCs and PMCs related to the 
monopoly concept, the research question in this thesis can be formulated as: “How 
does the use of Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies by the 
US affect its monopoly on the use of legitimate force?” .  
The formulation of the research question is thus meant to make it possible to take a 
different approach than those suggesting that PSCs and PMCs represent a weakening 
of the state monopoly on legitimate violence per se (i.e. Singer 2003: 18). Hence, this 
thesis will not accept that the existence and use of PSCs and PMCs automatically 
weaken state monopoly on legitimate violence. Instead, the formulation of the 
research question in this thesis is intended to make it possible to investigate this issue 
closer. This thesis will furthermore focus on the US between 2001 and early 2008. 
This is done not only to narrow the research approach, but also due to the notion that 
the use of PSCs and PMCs by the US especially in post conflict settings have gotten 
increased attention after 2001.  
This thesis thus takes the starting point that the US holds a monopoly on the use of 
legitimate violence. This thus becomes the dependent variable where a possible 
change might be identified. The independent variables that may affect this become 
the PSCs and PMCs which the US has contracted. Furthermore, the core focus will be 
on US based PSCs and PMCs. To answer the research question, three hypotheses will 
be formulated to ease and structure the analysis. These hypotheses are intended to 
cover important aspects of the monopoly on legitimate violence concept as it have 
been formulated by Weber (Thomson 1994: 7).  
The first hypothesis focuses on whether the use of PSCs and PMCs affects the 
functional ability the US has to produce security. This is important, because 
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functional ability of the state is tightly connected to the ability states have to pacify 
and produce security for its citizens (Rotberg 2004: 3). Furthermore, this is an 
important requisite in order to be defined as a strong state (ibid), thus connecting state 
ability to monopolize legitimate violence to sovereignty. Secondly, this thesis will 
create a hypothesis intended to investigate whether the PSCs and PMCs can be 
considered legitimate actors within the security providing structures in the US. It is 
thus expected that the impact the PSCs and PMCs have on the monopoly on 
legitimate force is dependent on whether they are considered as legitimate actors in 
the US. Thirdly, this thesis will investigate whether the US is able to exercise 
political control over those PSCs and PMCs that it has hired or have the US as state 
of origin. Such an approach is useful because it is commonly accepted that the ability 
states have to exercise control over those exercising violence is an important part of 
how states monopolize violence (Thomson 1994: 8). This also makes it possible to 
investigate two different roles held by the US, where one is as a client and the other 
as representing a monopoly on violence versus the existence of the market for 
services provided by PSCs and PMCs. This thesis will only include non state actor 
procurement of services from PSCs, such as Transnational Corporations (TNCs) 
when the given TNC is hired by the US. When TNCs or NGOs hire services from 
PSCs or PMCs when not contracted by the US, is therefore outside the aim of this 
thesis. The main reason for this is rooted in the belief that when a TNC or NGO 
operate outside US territory, they do not threaten the US monopoly on legitimate 
force per se. 
The research question thus focuses on the consequences of using PSC and PMC in 
the US related to different aspects of the concept of a state monopoly on legitimate 
violence. 
1.2 Research design and Methodology 
When studying how the PSCs and PMCs affect the US monopoly on legitimate 
violence, different research strategies may be carried out. The first possibility is to 
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undertake a single study of the US and its PSCs and PMCs, thus loosing the 
possibilities to generalize from the findings. Secondly, the US can also be treated as a 
case study where the approach of the US towards the PSCs and PMCs can be used to 
generalize to other strong states that use or house these companies. From this 
approach, how the US have handled the challenges connected to PSCs and PMCs can 
be seen as representative for how other strong states have approached these 
companies and the consequences this have had for the monopoly on violence 
(Andersen 1997: 73; Gerring 2004: 342). 
A commonly accepted advantage of the case study design is its ability to focus on one 
unit in order to illuminate findings that might be transferable to a larger set of units 
(Yin 2003: 13). Hence, by applying the case study design here, also opens up for the 
possibilities of focusing on special contextual factors that might affect the analysis 
(Gerring 2004: 344). A core challenge with using the US and its relationship to the 
PSCs and PMCs in order to investigate how these actors affect monopoly on state 
violence is, that the US can be said to be somewhat special. The country has a long 
history of relying on PMCs in supportive roles (Kidwell 2005:1), starting before the 
end of the Cold War, which is commonly accepted as the starting point of the 
blossoming of these industries (Singer 2003: 49). Furthermore, the country is today 
perhaps the biggest spender on services from these companies. After the end of the 
Cold War, the US also used PSCs and PMCs as proxies in order to achieve foreign 
political goals as is exemplified by the hiring of MPRI on the Balkans in the 1990s 
(Singer 2003: 124-130). Hence, few, if any other strong states have made so much 
use, and become so reliant on their Private Security Industry (PSI) and Private 
Military Industry (PMI), or allowed them to participate so much in the security sphere 
after the end of the Cold War, as the US. Furthermore, perhaps with the exception of 
the UK, who allegedly allowed Sandline to support certain groups in Sierra Leone in 
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the 1990s2, few strong states have used a PSC or PMC as proxies in order to reach 
foreign political goals.  
This thesis thus supports itself on Gerring (2004: 348) and will argue that the 
possibilities to generalize from the findings using the US, to other strong states when 
it comes to the use of PSCs and PMCs may be difficult. This does however not rule 
out the possibility that something can be learned from the findings, using the US as a 
case. Such a view roots itself in the fact that because the US has relied on PMCs for a 
long time, and uses them and PSCs extensively today. Hence, it might possibly have 
experienced more aspects and consequences of this practice than most other states 
that have declined to involve PSCs and PMCs in the “sphere of security” at an equal 
degree. From this perspective it can thus be argued that if other states follow the steps 
of the US by implementing private solutions into their security sphere, they may 
experience challenges equivalent to the US. Hence, the learning argument should 
hold some weight as the US can be considered a frontrunner in the case of using 
PSCs and PMCs. 
The strategy of this thesis will thus be to investigate how the monopoly on legitimate 
violence held by the US is affected by its use of PSCs and PMCs. To investigate this, 
the focus will be on three pathways in which the concepts of monopoly on legitimate 
violence rests. Hence, a theoretical framework designed to grasp how PSCs and 
PMCs may affect the US monopoly on legitimate violence will be created. The 
analysis will consist of three parts investigating these pathways closer by applying 
the theoretical framework. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework  
This thesis will make use of several theoretical contributions to create a theoretical 
framework, which will be applied in the analysis of the overarching research 
                                              
2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/05/98/arms_to_africa_row/207586.stm 
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question. Creating an own theoretical framework has been undertaken in order to be 
able to investigate some core aspects of how PSCs and PMCs affect the monopoly on 
legitimate force held by the US. In order to avoid the view that the involvement of 
these companies automatically lead to a weakening of the US held monopoly on 
legitimate force, the aim of the theoretical framework is thus to identify core 
characteristics of the monopoly on legitimate force assumption that might be affected 
by the use and existence of PSCs and PMCs. Several different theoretical 
contributions have been used in order to achieve this goal. Criterions that have been 
used when these theoretical contributions have been selected include their relevance 
to the research question and to identifying the mechanisms that this thesis will focus 
on. Furthermore, contributions that provide alternative explanations have also been 
applied in order to be able to discuss the relevance of the core contributions. Another 
criterion here has been to choose amongst theoretical contributions that focuses on 
PSCs and PMCs related to the mechanisms investigated. 
On a more general level, this thesis can be said to place itself within the area of the 
discussion of whether PSCs and PMCs weakens states functional abilities to produce 
security, whether the PSCs and PMCs should be considered as legitimate actors in the 
areas which they operate, and finally prospects of putting these companies under 
political control. Taken together, these areas arguably represent core challenges 
related to the role of the state versus non-state actors. Furthermore they are also areas 
that should be considered to have gotten increased attention since scholars got their 
interest in PSCs and PMCs. 
In order to make the theoretical framework able to grasp these areas, the starting 
point will be a discussion of the monopoly on legitimate force concept and its 
relevance related to the US. Here, Thomson (1994: 7-10) and her discussion of 
different conceptualizing approaches of the state monopolization of legitimate force, 
together with the contribution of Rotberg (2004: 3) who connects the status of the 
state with the ability it has to produce security will be used to illuminate the 
connection between functionality and state monopoly on legitimate force. After this 
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relationship has been clarified, a closer investigation of some important aspects of 
legitimacy and how this can be connected to PSCs and PMCs will be investigated. 
Central contributions here include Jachtenfuchs (2005) who interprets the Weberian 
understanding of legitimacy to state monopoly on legitimate force and the emergence 
of non-state actors. Furthermore, this thesis will also support itself on Barker (1990), 
Clark (2005) and Tucker & Hendrickson (2004) in order to elaborate different aspects 
of legitimacy. Another contribution which is the one of Føllesdal (2004) will also 
play a most important role here. The last section of the theoretical framework chapter 
will focus on political control and challenges related to this, especially connected to 
PSCs and PMCs will also be elaborated. Avant (2005: 41-43) and her discussion of 
consequences and abilities of states, related to the exercise of political control will be 
central here, alongside Rasch (2000: 68-73) and his focus on agency-theory issues. 
Taken together, the intention is that these contributions can assist in investigating the 
research question. 
1.4 Empirical Sources 
This thesis will draw on a wide array of empirical sources in order to obtain empirical 
evidence. These are formal studies, which includes articles, books, reports, and 
newspaper and magazine articles. Furthermore, this thesis will also draw upon the 
findings in three surveys which illuminate aspects of the use of PSCs and PMCs in 
the US. Taken together, the different sources have been evaluated to provide me with 
enough material to investigate this thesis. The research approach in this thesis 
therefore fits well with what Fielding & Fielding (2000: 677) describes as 
“Secondary analysis”. Such an approach suggests that the qualitative data is 
examined in order to “pursue interests distinct from the original work” (ibid.). This is 
underlined by the core aim of this thesis, which is to analyze how the US monopoly 
on legitimate violence is affected by the PSCs and PMCs, thus differentiating from 
those contributions taking this for granted. This thesis will thus apply already existing 
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theoretical contributions in order to analyze how PSCs and PMCs affect the US 
monopoly on legitimate violence.  
The selection of the different sources has been undertaken in order to be able to 
create a proper theoretical framework and to get empirical examples enough to 
undertake a well founded analyzing of the research question. Hence, there has been a 
focus on choosing from academic sources that have been considered as some of the 
most central related to the focus in this thesis.  
According to Leander (2007), there is a “hype surrounding” the PSI and PMI. This is 
evident as the production of books, articles and papers have increased considerably 
since the late 1990s, the heydays of Executive Outcomes, perhaps one of the most 
famous PMCs in the world, after its involvement in conflicts on the African 
continent. Another goal has been to collect empirical evidences of what the PSCs and 
PMCs do especially related to how they affect what is being the core aim of this 
thesis, the monopoly on legitimate force.  
Some books have been used as an academic basis for this thesis. Singer’s “Corporate 
Warriors” (2003) and Avant’s “A Market for Force” (2005) contributes with 
insightful analysis of the rise of the PMI and the PSI, especially focusing on the 
consequences related to classification of these actors and the consequences related to 
the ability to exercise political control over them. This is also true for Isenberg’s 
BASIC report (2004) focusing on PSC and PMC activity in Iraq. Schreier & Caparini 
(2005) provides another insightful contribution with their DCAF occasional paper. 
Furthermore, the report by Kidwell (2003) provide an important contribution in this 
thesis because connects the PSCs and PMCs with the US. 
A wide variety of research institutions have also produced interesting and useful 
contributions. For example Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 
in Geneva, Norwegian FAFO, and Swedish SIPRI are some, but not the only research 
institutions this thesis have profited from using. Furthermore, several other scholars 
and news articles covers issues related to PSCs and PMCs, more generally have been 
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used. However, some challenges occur when selecting useful contributions is 
undertaken. The first is to avoid those being biased. The activity of PSCs and PMCs 
still kicks of controversy within some establishments. Attempts will therefore be 
made in order to avoid biased contributions if the aim is to provide facts. Some 
foreign news sources such as, but not limited to BBC and Washington Post are used 
in this thesis. This has been done in order to cover the US, and because these sources 
have proven to be amongst the first to report on news and developments in the 
industries together with political development.  
An internet based forum, started by the President of the International Peace 
Operations Association (IPOA) situated in Washington DC, US, Doug Brooks has 
also been a source of knowledge and information. Writers in this forum include both 
proponents and opponents of the PSCs and PMCs and have been a valuable source 
for articles and news related to the industries. Members worldwide post links and 
discuss issues connected to the PSCs and PMCs. I had to write an email to Mr. 
Brooks in order to get access to this forum. Of course it can be argued that this 
practice might be used as a filter, where Mr. Brooks can deny access to those being 
most critical to what the PSCs, PMCs and IPOA does. However, several harsh 
comments towards PSC and PMC activity and IPOA being posted on the forum 
suggest otherwise. 
Furthermore, one documentary has been assessed to hold value in order to obtain an 
understanding of the subject of PSCs and PMCs involvement in conflict zones on a 
more general level. This is “Shadow Companies - The Movie”. The film includes 
several interviews with employees of PMCs and PSCs, academics, former militaries 
and journalists and was endorsed as “powerful and fair” by the Amnesty 
International3.  
                                              
3 http://www.shadowcompanythemovie.com/reviews_buzz.html 
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Attempts were made to get in touch with Norwegians that have worked within these 
industries, especially for PSCs and PMCs contracted by the US. I spoke to a high 
ranking employee of an international PSC with offices in Norway who promised to 
put me in touch with someone he knew had been to Iraq working for one of the larger 
US based PSCs. I never heard from him again. This might suggest that he did not 
know anyone or that those he knew was unwilling to come forward and speak to me. 
It can also be seen as a sign of the sensitivity surrounding the issue of PSCs and 
PMCs working in conflict zones or that policy of some PSCs and PMCs prohibit its 
employees to speak to others about their work. Hence, no interviews where 
conducted.  
1.5 Validity and Reliability 
The establishing of correct operational measures related to the concept that are being 
studied (Yin 2003: 34), is important in order to clarify if the sources that have been 
used to investigate the research question are trustworthy. In the section of empirical 
sources, both strengths and weaknesses related to this were addressed. Furthermore, 
the centrality of some of the core theoretical contributions was addressed. Hence, it 
can be argued that the theoretical contributions specifically focusing on effects of 
PSCs and PMCs should be considered as strengthening the construct validity.  
Another issue here is concerning number of sources. According to Yin (2003: 34) it is 
important to use several sources in order to establish high construct validity. This 
thesis make use of a wide array of secondary sources which includes newspapers, 
internet sites such as forums and institutional websites, academic papers, books and a 
documentary. The importance and potential challenges of these sources was 
addressed in the part of this chapter addressing empirical sources, and should be 
considered as underlining their relevance. These sources can be considered as 
strengthening the construct validity. However, a weakness is that this thesis does not 
make use of interviews as a source of empirical data. Nevertheless, it can be argued 
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that the demand of several sources has been fulfilled and thus established high 
construct validity.  
Internal validity is the ability to take into account other factors that might affect what 
is being investigated (Yin 2003: 36). In this thesis, it is therefore most important to 
specify the focus of analysis and clarify the position of the concept of legitimate 
violence related to other factors that might affect it. It will here be argued that the 
theoretical contributions and the discussion of these in the theoretical framework 
chapter clarify this. Hence the internal validity of this research design is secured by 
applying theoretical contributions that clarifies the role of the monopoly on legitimate 
violence as a widely accepted concept and its importance in the view of the sovereign 
state more generally. 
External validity concerns if the findings in a study can be generalizable beyond the 
study itself to other similar cases (Yin 2003: 37). Hence, the question is whether the 
findings done when the US as a case is investigated might be generalized to other 
states. A strategy to heighten the external validity would be to include more cases, 
but this strategy has been abandoned in order to provide a more in depth analysis of 
the US. Furthermore, because the US may be considered a frontrunner in the 
implementation of market based techniques in the security sphere (Mandel 2003: 36), 
the consequences of this related to the monopoly on legitimate violence might be 
more visible than for strong states that have taken a more reluctant approach. From 
this view, the external validity is rooted in the notion that what the US has 
experienced, may be experienced by other states following equal strategies as the US 
in the future. However, due to the fact that this thesis will follow a single case 
strategy, the potential for learning from it findings should be emphasized. 
Reliability is the ability to reproduce an already conducted case study. In this thesis 
all sources used have been documented thus making it possible for others to retrieve 
them. If anyone want to replicate this thesis, reliability also include that those doing 
this should be able to replicate the data I have used (King et al. 1994: 26).  The list of 
authorities includes the sources of the data used. A core problem here is especially 
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related to the material that has been retrieved from the internet. Internet as a source 
can be troublesome because they are less constant than books and such. One example 
of this is the webpsite of Blackwater Security which has changed both lay-out and 
content several times in a one year period. Furthermore, perhaps as a result of the fact 
that PSCs and PMCs are profit driven entities, they merge, shut down and rename 
themselves. The consequence is thus that some of the PSCs and PMCs used as 
examples in this thesis may have changed names, areas of operations and owners by 
the time this thesis is finished. However, the strategy to be followed in this thesis has 
been outlined in this chapter, and this should make potential reproduction possible.  
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has been dedicated at setting the stage for the forthcoming analysis of 
the consequences of using PSCs and PMCs related to the perceived US monopoly on 
legitimate force. Several methodological issues have been addressed here that are 
assumed to have consequences for the investigation of the research question which 
was formulated as “How does the use of Private Security Companies and Private 
Military Companies by the US affect its monopoly on the use of legitimate force?” .  
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2. Background 
2.1 Introduction 
The establishing of state monopolization of legitimate force came about after a 
historically lengthy process (Thomson 1994: 11). As a result of the development 
where the state consolidated its position as the center from which violence should be 
projected, the military and police became the preferred tools for states to control their 
citizens and their territory. The US has as this chapter will illustrate a long history of 
using of PMCs and PSCs both previous to and subsequent to the establishing of the 
expectation suggesting that modern states should hold a monopoly on legitimate 
force. Simultaneously, the US has during history evolved to become the possessor of 
the most modern militaries in the world. The relationship between the militaries and 
the people can also be described as being regulated via several mechanism held by 
the Congress in order to exercise checks and balances on them. Today, no other 
country spends more on their militaries than the US. Furthermore, the US militaries 
are today committed globally and play an important role as a foreign policy tool. The 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) initiated after the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks on 
selected targets in the US, put even more workload on US forces. Simultaneously, it 
has been noticed that “Private security companies now provide more services and 
more kinds of services including some that have been considered core military 
capabilities in the modern era” (Avant 2005: 3). This is the framework for which this 
chapter will elaborate the development of the role of PSCs and PMCs as a participant 
in the US production of security for their citizens against outside threats. 
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2.2 Structure of Chapter 
This chapter will provide a brief background on the political system in the US. It will 
continue by investigate the historical development of PSCs and PMCs and the US. 
The chapter will continue by providing an oversight and classification of 
contemporary PSCs and PMCs hired by the US.   
2.3 The Political System in the United States 
The political system in the US consists of the legislative, executive and judiciary 
branches. For this thesis it should be noticed that the role of Congress as legislative 
finds its legitimacy in Article I of the Constitution. The Congress in the US has been 
given a wide responsibility, including the right to make laws (Cummings Jr. & Wise 
2005: 52). The Congress consists of the House and the Senate and can modify old 
legislations and undertake hearings (ibid. 406). The President of the US is the bearer 
of the executive powers and this is rooted in Article II of the Constitution (Cummings 
Jr. & Wise 2005: 52). The President has the power to veto Bills which is proposals of 
new laws from the Congress (ibid. 406). The President in the US is the ceremonial 
and symbolic head of state and government (ibid. 422). The role of the president also 
includes being Chief Executive and Commander in Chief (ibid. 423, 425). This brief 
review of the political system in the US underlines the important role of the Congress 
versus the Executive branch. 
2.4  Historical Traits of Non-State Violence in the United 
States 
Thomson (1994: 3) argues that “contemporary organization of global violence is 
neither timeless nor natural”, but is instead a distinct modern phenomenon. A quick 
review of history underlines this. Mercenarism has existed at least since 1294 BC, 
when the ruling Egyptian Pharaoh used them at the battle of Kadesh (Singer 2003: 
20). In the US, contractors and Privateers were hired during the War of Independence 
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from 1775 to 1783 (Thomson 1994: 9, 25). The first known PSC, selling technical 
security solutions represented with the introduction of burglar alarms emerged in the 
late 19th century, and was promoted by US based ATM (Johnston 1992: 18). By then, 
PSCs such as the Pinkerton Group and the Wells Fargo Company had already been 
established (Johnston 1992: 20).  
Eventually professional armies relying on conscripts and public police forces became 
preferred tools for producing security and pacifying citizens (Jachtenfuchs 2005: 38). 
Hence, from the 20th century, states considered modern, managed to make the 
historical traditional way of exercising legitimate violence illegitimate. Violence thus 
came from a single center, the state. The US did however not abandon the use of 
private contractors for their armed forces. This is exemplified by the fact that over 
1000 employees of Morrison-Knudsen walked into captivity alongside the US 
Marines force defending the Wake Island that fell to Japanese hands in 1941 (Kidwell 
2005: 1).  
By the 1950s, several post colonial conflicts emerged on the African continent. This 
created a market for mercenaries. Individuals with dubious motives participated in 
coups and civil wars. For example “Les Affreux”, was accused of racism and 
hindering the stabilizing of the newly born African states (Singer 2003: 38). Their 
presence was internationally condemned and led to legal actions to de-legitimize and 
make punishable their activities. The US however continued to rely on contractors 
and hired approximately 245 000 civilians, spending over $1,522,925,000 on them 
during the Korean War (1951-1953), filling support and supply roles (Kidwell 2005: 
15). As the US got military committed in Vietnam, PMCs such as Kellogg, Brown & 
Root (KBR) and Morrison-Knudson Corporation would play a significant role in 
supportive roles of the US armed forces including technicians and construction work 
close to the battlefield (Kidwell 2005: 16). This underlines that the US has a history 
of making extensive use of PMCs long before the end of the Cold War, which is 
commonly accepted as the start of the growing importance and size of PSCs and 
PMCs on a global scale (Singer 2003: 49).  
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2.5 The Global Corporate Turn and the United States 
The consolidation of PMCs and PSCs after the Cold War can be explained by 
focusing on structural and political changes (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 4-6; Singer 
2003: 49-70). Cheap weaponry and professional soldiers without work flooded the 
market, which led to easy access to qualified manpower and more or less advanced 
military equipment (Singer 2003: 53). In the US, the end of the Cold War led to a 
demobilizing and a restructuring of the armed forces (Kidwell 2005: 21). As bipolar 
superpower competition disappeared, the international system was affected. Many 
client states that had benefited from playing the superpowers against each others to 
protect national interests, found themselves in a situation where this was no longer 
possible (Brayton 2002: 308). Internal turmoil, civil wars or even total state 
breakdown coupled with unwillingness from the international society and the UN to 
respond to solve these conflicts, made private actors a feasible alternative for 
assistance (Brayton 2002: 308; Singer 2003: 58). Hence, a global market for PMCs 
and PSCs was created.  
Ideological and market based techniques also emerged (Peters 2003: 25; Schreier & 
Caparini 2005: 7). Some states, such as the US went further than others and opened 
up for more extensive outsourcing and privatizing of parts of security related tasks 
(Mandel 2003: 36). Privatization thus came to suggest lesser public involvement in 
the production of public goods (Berndtsson 2006: 12), and in some states, such as the 
US this also included sovereign tasks meaning the production of security.  
In the US, Business Executives for National Security (BENS), argued that a 
“Revolution in Military Business Affairs” (RMBA) to support the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) had to be introduced (Markusen 2003: 487). The emergence 
and impact of the RMA and the Revolution in Financial Affairs (RFA) further 
contributed to pave way for private actors in the military realm (Hartley 2001: 94). 
Hence, both rationalization and the need for readiness came to play important roles 
for the use of PMCs and PSCs in the US (Kidwell 2005: 20-21). Furthermore, many 
Western armies moved in a post modern direction recognized by downsizing, 
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diminishing of combat versus support roles, restructuring, more professionalizing, 
internationalizing and less public support (Moskos et. al. 2000: 2). The post Cold 
War situation thus created a viable market for private involvement in sovereign 
related tasks. In the US, the first umbrella contract concerning maintenance of 5 
military bases was signed by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1987 (Kidwell 
2005: 18). In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, a United States Governmental 
Accounting Office (GAO) report (1994: 39) recommended that the US militaries and 
the DOD should pursue measures to “ensure that military operational planning 
includes civilian support”.  
2.6 Classification of the Companies 
 “It makes no sense to lump military logistics services firms like Kellogg, 
Brown & Root (KBR), in with the likes of Blackwater or ArmorGroup” 
        David Isenberg (2006a)  
The evolution of companies involved in security provision or assisting in this process 
has taken several pathways and this thesis will therefore create a categorization that 
will be used in this thesis. 
2.6.1 Private Military Combat Companies  
On one hand, Private Military Companies (PMCs) focused on fighting wars evolved 
during a brief period in the wake of the termination of the Cold War. Heavily armed, 
tactically superior and often tightly connected to companies with economic interests 
especially focusing on the extraction of nature based resources, these companies took 
advantage of the easy access to advanced military equipment and highly trained 
soldiers4, and weak states need for easy accessibility to military strength. Their will 
                                              
4 For example Executive Outcomes relied on veterans from 32.batalion (SADF), well known for its operations against 
Cuban forces in Angola in the 1970s. 
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to go public, their use of databases providing a pool of potential employees and the
corporate structure should be noticed as core points separating them from ordinary 
mercenaries (Singer 2003: 73-87). In this thesis, these kinds of PMCs will be referred 
to as Private Military Combat Companies (PMCCs). This approach is rooted in two 
aspects. From a functional perspective, these companies where able to undertake full 
scale military operations without any outside support. They possessed all or most 
assets needed to undertake a military operation, often independent on military support 
from their client. Such companies can be considered as force multipliers thus 
implying that their participation increases the hiring state’s functional ability to 
pacify citizens or defend territory from outside threats. From a geographical 
perspective related to distance to the frontline, they operated in the frontline, in the 
proximity to the frontline and in the rear. Perhaps the best example of such a 
company is now defunct Executive Outcomes which originated out of South Africa in 
the 1990s. This PMCC is famous for its operations in Sierra Leone where they 
bolstered a fully functional private army with an air force, armored combat units and 
a fully functional supply service (Singer 2003). Their involvement and success in 
Sierra Leone underlined the agility and effectiveness of this breed of PMCs. It is 
however unclear how many PMCCs exist today. 
ir 
2.6.2 Private Military Companies 
A second kind of companies also emerged. These companies took a different focal 
point of business and focused on fulfilling the needs national armies had. These 
companies thus based their product line on the need for specialized skills and 
realization of non combat roles. Although being relied on in the US since the Civil 
War, their breakthrough on the international stage came in the late 1980s (Singer 
2003). These companies would place most of their effort in offering services that 
would take care of the essential needs an army had, often in relation to the 
implementation of RMA components. Building and running of camps, transportation 
and maintenance were also amongst the first tasks these breed of companies would 
undertake in the US (Kidwell 2005). Hence, what Ken Hartley (2001: 95) describes 
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as “in house” tasks became the main area of business for these companies. Today, 
these companies have evolved and hold the capacity to fulfill most military related 
support functions. Hence, they involve themselves in everything from building 
military camps, taking care of the daily running of them, to training of troops, 
gathering of intelligence and providing of translators and advisory services. They 
provide Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams and they are involved in 
psychological warfare operations. Companies focusing on supplying armies with fuel, 
spare parts and so forth are also found here. 
Many of the main actors here have grown out of larger corporations which have 
focused on several areas of business. Furthermore, because of the complexity of new 
weapons systems, it has become more common amongst weapons manufacturers to 
include instructors for a given period of time available for the procurer (Brayton 
2002: 311). Examples of such companies include large and well known actors such as 
MPRI which has trained Croat and Bosnian forces on the Balkans in the 1990s, 
working as advisors in Columbia and trained Iraqi and US forces in Iraq after the US 
invasion in 2003 (Singer 2003: 119-135). Former subsidiary of Halliburton, Kellogg, 
Brown & Root (KBR) has been involved in US military operations from the Vietnam 
War, holding a long track record of constructing and running camps in a wide array 
of different conflict zones (Kidwell 2003: 30). Today, this PMC is heavily involved 
in support and supply operations supporting US forces in Iraq. A core characteristic 
with these companies is that they are not designed to participate in actual fighting. 
Perhaps the best example of this notion is that MPRI, mentioned above often follow a 
no weapon policy, for example when they work in Iraq (Schumacher 2006: 147). 
Because PMCs often provides combat essential support such as munitions and fuel, it 
also puts them in a most important role. Sustainment and Stabilization Operations 
(SASOs) such as the one in current Iraq have put these companies in close proximity 
to the battlefield (Kidwell 2003: 32). How they perform can thus easily affect military 
operational outcome. In order to cover the wide array of different services these 
companies provide, they will in this thesis be referred to as Private Military 
 28 
Companies (PMCs) to underline their tight connection to military related security 
production. 
2.6.3 Low Intensity Private Security Companies  
The development has however not stopped here. A third breed of companies has also 
consolidated their position. Private Security Companies (PSCs) commonly associated 
with the contribution of what Les Johnston (1992: finn) describes as “day to day 
security” strengthened their position in the post Cold War environment. 
Contemporary PSCs work for private clients including individuals, governments and 
Transnational Companies (TNCs)/Multinational Companies (MNCs). Private security 
can here be understood as:  
“services other than public law enforcement and regulatory agencies that are 
engaged primary in the prevention and investigation of crime, loss, or harm to 
specific individuals, organizations or facilities” (Forst 2000: 23). 
These companies guard shopping malls, corporate buildings and private homes. They 
regulate access to governmental property and they sell technical based security 
solutions such as alarms and surveillance cameras. The growth of these companies is 
according to Les Johnston (1999: 179) explained by for example public fear of crime 
and overburdened public police forces. The provision of technological equipment 
such as alarms and surveillance cameras or CCTV systems and other technological 
solutions has helped to bolster the economic growth of these companies. Today, the 
two largest PSCs, Securitas and Group 4 Securicor (G4S), together employ over 
600 000 men and women globally (Companies Websites). Combined the two PSCs 
alone had a multi billon turnover last fiscal year (ibid.).  
From a functional perspective, the core focus of these PSCs is to provide security by 
providing passive and active measures such as technology and manpower. 
Geographically they focus on the home market or within the territory of which they 
have a national branch. Even though some of the actors are global entities and others 
 29
are national companies without the ability or whish to extend their area of business 
outside their state of origin, they get their main income from operations in non 
conflictual settings, although some of these companies are known to have 
subsidiaries that also work in conflict zones. In this thesis these companies will be 
referred to as Low Intensity PSCs (LIPSC) due to their focus on work in non 
conflictual settings.  
2.6.4 Private Security Companies 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, attention has been drawn to a smaller category of 
PSCs that have focused on earning their profit in dangerous conflict zones. Some of 
these PSCs allegedly have ties to defunct PMCCs. One such example is British based 
AEGIS which is headed by Tim Spicer, the founder of now defunct Sandline 
International which became famous for its involvement in alleged weapons 
smuggling to Sierra Leone in the 1990s (BBC 1998: Website). Some core differences 
exist between these PSCs and the LIPSCs. First, it is often believed that PSCs hire 
mostly amongst ex Special Forces soldiers, other ex military personnel and ex law 
enforcement officers. Secondly, they work in areas were the threat level is high, Iraq 
and Afghanistan being such examples. Thirdly, they often adopt a policy of arming 
themselves as heavy as they are allowed to. In Afghanistan and Iraq this includes 
guns, assault rifles, and heavy machine guns, up armored vehicles, and airborne lift 
and fighting capacity. This has led to some confusion to whether they should be 
regarded as performing offensive military or more defensive security related tasks. 
This thesis will however argue that from a functional perspective, these companies 
are different from the PMCCs. This is because they are organized to protect and not 
to fight. Even if they possess lighter arms they do not have the capacity to conduct 
full scale military operations. They can however provide intelligence and other 
services equivalent to those provided by PMCs and they are able to respond if being 
attacked. Furthermore, they also work for armies providing local security. Well 
known actors here include Blackwater Security, DynCorp and Triple Canopy hired to 
protect members of the US State Department abroad (Fedspending.org). Other well 
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known PSCs originating from the US includes SOC-SMG and OSSI. Supported by 
the findings so far, this thesis presupposes that PSCs are hired to provide protection 
and not to fight wars. Geographically, they focus on missions in conflictual or post 
war settings as providers of security enhancing solutions for their clients. This 
suggests that they most often travel outside their state of origin and thus are exporters 
of security solutions. In this thesis these companies will be referred to as PSCs thus 
underlining that they differ considerably from the LIPSCs providing a guard at your 
local shopping mall.  
2.6.5 Results of the Evolution 
“I am not entirely sure. It started to creep into the vocabulary…. At the very 
beginning, in the Papua New Guinea incident it was still dogs of war.' Then it 
became mercenaries' and then subsequent to the Sierra Leone business the 
words private military company' crept into the vernacular.” 
       Sara Pearson, Spa Way (2002)5 
The usefulness of separating between the different companies as this chapter has done 
can be seen in relation to the overarching research question. Being aware that 
different companies have different capacities, is important in order to investigate their 
functional consequences related to US ability to produce security. It is also important 
to separate between these companies, because throwing everyone into the same 
melting pot would leave us with little understanding of the complexity and different 
consequences the involvement of these companies may have on the different aspects 
of the state monopoly on legitimate force. Hence, the thesis will use the different 
terms to denote that the companies are different in what they do and where they do it. 
This thesis will thus support itself on the wisdom of Schreier & Caparini (2005: 33) 
who argues that “[…]“the only unifying factor is that they offer services that fall 
                                              
5 Quoted in Campbell (2002). 
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within the military and security privatization domain”. In defense of the approach 
taken by this thesis, it will be argued that it is challenging to create a classification of 
these companies, because of their fluid structure and involvement in several business 
areas. Hence, even though the approach taken here might not be the final solution, it 
is aimed at making it possible to investigate the overarching research question in this 
thesis.  
2.6.6 Summary 
A central aspect in this chapter is the illumination of the longstanding practice in the 
US of hiring PMCs to fulfill supportive roles in security production. Furthermore, 
PMCs and PSCs with corporate structures emerged in the US long before the end of 
the Cold War. The classification of the PSCs and PMCs based on functional capacity 
and geographical area of operation led to the creation of four different types of 
companies. The classification will be used in the forthcoming analysis. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1  Introduction 
The extensive involvement of PSCs and PMCs in the US production of security for 
their citizens might at first glance be taken to represent a great challenge to the notion 
that the US have been able to monopolize the use of legitimate force. By contracting 
out military related tasks, the US has opened up for private involvement in tasks that 
traditionally has been considered inherently sovereign. In relation to this, it should be 
taken into consideration that the US has used PMCs for 219 years, which thus may be 
taken to suggest that the US never had a monopoly on legitimate force in the first 
place. The overarching research question which was formulated as “How does the use 
of Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies by the US affect its 
monopoly on the use of legitimate force?” does however suggest that the US has a 
monopoly on legitimate force, and this chapter will create a theoretical framework 
which will be designated to help shed light on this issue.  
3.2 Structure of Chapter 
This chapter will start by discussing issues related to the monopoly on legitimate 
violence thesis. It will be clarified how this thesis will interpret monopoly, violence 
and legitimacy. How political control is to be understood, will also be investigated 
and connected to the overarching research question. It will continue by investigating 
what the state needs to put under political control in order to be able claim a 
monopoly on legitimate force. Agency-theory will be examined and used as a tool 
that can shed light on possible challenges states have to exercise political control over 
the PSCs and PMCs. This chapter will create three hypotheses that will be applied to 
structure the forthcoming investigation and support the investigation of the 
overarching research question. 
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3.3 State Monopoly on Legitimate Violence  
From a historical perspective, the state has only been able to monopolize violence for 
the last 200 years (Thomson 1994).  Perhaps the best known expression suggesting 
this is the one of Weber, who defined the modern state to be “a human community 
that would (successfully) claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” (1991/1921: 78). Others such as Tilly and Giddens have also 
formulated somewhat different definitions of the modern state (Thomson 1994: 7). 
These differences become evident as Giddens talks about direct control over the 
means of internal and external violence, and Tilly speaks about controlling the 
principle means of violence (Thomson 1994: 7). Weber, for his part, talks about the 
monopolization of violence (ibid.). This thesis will apply Weber’s definition as a 
starting point because it contains the concept legitimacy, a term that is left out by 
both Tilly and Giddens due to its “normative implications” (Thomson 1994: 7). 
Legitimacy as a concept will be investigated closer later in this chapter and it is the 
core motivation for why this thesis will use Weber’s definition of the modern state as 
a starting point. This decision bases itself on the belief that legitimacy is an important 
aspect when the relationship between PSCs and PMCs and the US is investigated. 
3.3.1 State Monopoly on Legitimate Force Today 
A question that needs clarification in this regard is whether a definition of the modern 
state holds any relevance today. Today, warlords, rebels, terrorists, and organized 
crime organizations are all non state actors willing to use violence to reach their goals 
(Mair 2003: 12) Furthermore, intra state, low-intensity, local and regional conflicts 
have led to “new wars”, identified as sometimes being carried out by groups of non 
state actors using asymmetrical warfare strategies to deal with strong opponents 
(Kaldor 1999). The emergence of such conflicts has led to an internationalizing of the 
use of force such as the use of multi national coalitions to answer these threats (Wulf 
2005: 19). Furthermore, globalization and the evolution of non-governmental 
organizations emphasize that the state and its position as a sovereign is challenged. It 
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has also been argued that the view suggesting that states have a monopoly on 
legitimate force has been widely overestimated (Avant 2005: 2). Taken together, the 
question is therefore whether Weber’s definition of a state monopoly on violence is 
useful for little else than “abstract theorizing” (Berndtsson 2006: 4). Hence, it may 
thus be asked how valuable it is to ask whether the US has a monopoly of legitimate 
violence in the first place. 
As a starting point in defense of the Weberian definition of the modern state, it can be 
argued that the idea of the state as a monopolist on legitimate use of force is still 
widely accepted. This argument is supported by the observation that a state monopoly 
on legitimate force is essential in theoretical approaches aimed at analyzing state 
relations with a state centric view. For example, realists argue that states are 
monopolists of legitimate force (Legro & Moravcsik 1999: 13; Risse 2002: 260). 
Furthermore, it is often taken for granted that the consolidation of the PSCs and 
PMCs challenge the state monopoly on legitimate violence in one way or the other 
(Avant 2005: 3; Mandel 2002: ix; Singer 2003: 18; Wulf 2006: 92). As a result, it can 
be argued that by merely asking whether these companies challenge it, something has 
to be challenged. According to Clifford J. Rosky (2002: 886), supporters of the view 
that the state should be a monopolist of legitimate force are identified amongst 
“[scholars]: Judges, lawyers, politicians and pundits”. It may thus be argued that the 
belief in the existence of a monopoly on violence holds a rather unique position that 
have held its ground despite the emergence of globalization, new wars, and a growing 
importance of a wide range of non state actors.  
3.3.2 Why Monopolization of Legitimate Force is Important 
The motivation for why states should want to monopolize violence is, according to 
Jachtenfuchs (2005: 38), to protect and defend the state territory from outside threats 
and threats from within. Not only does this include pacification of citizens in order to 
make social interaction possible (ibid.). It is also important in relation to claim 
sovereignty and territorial control versus potential outside threats. State 
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monopolization of legitimate violence can therefore also be seen as connected to state 
making (Tilly 1985: 171-172), and according to some theoretical approaches, states 
ability to claim internal sovereignty (Thomson 1994: 11).  
The importance of monopolizing legitimate force can also be connected to the 
character of violence itself. Wimmer (2003: 3) argues that because violence is 
everybody’s resource, and easily organized, it is most important for states to be able 
to control it. The consequences of failing at it can be brutal, as it may turn the state 
into a weak or failed one (Rotberg 2004: 3). From this point of view, the 
consolidation of, the PSCs and PMCs can be seen as a potential threat to the state, 
because they represent a form of organized violence that potentially compete with 
state organized violence and its ability to protect itself from inside and outside 
threats. Furthermore, this can also be seen as an argument supporting the view that 
monopolization of legitimate violence still holds an important position in today’s 
world more generally. 
3.3.3 Interpreting What Monopoly Is   
Berndtsson (2006: 13) suggests that a state monopoly implies that production, 
subsidising and control of a public good are the domain of the state alone.  No other 
actors can, accordingly to this view, be involved in any aspects of the exercise of 
legitimate violence if a monopoly is to exist. Hence, from this perspective PSCs and 
PMCs can be said to challenge the notion that the US has a monopoly on legitimate 
force, because they are involved directly or indirectly in the production of the public 
good, security.  
Wimmer (2003: 1) for his part suggests that monopolization of violence will not lead 
to a “society without violence”. Hence, “monopoly” should not be interpreted to hold 
an economic connotation (ibid.). This approach seems plausible as the task of total 
pacification of citizens in any given state appear difficult, if not impossible. Instead, it 
might be argued that monopolization of legitimate violence refers to “the publicly 
exercised violence” (Kössler 2003: 19). This point is underlined by the fact that most 
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states allow their citizens to perform violence in certain cases, such as self defense. 
Total pacification is in other words rarely possible or preferable in most states.  
This thesis will therefore suggest that potential threats to the state monopoly on 
legitimate violence should be seen in relation to violence holding a certain degree of 
organization that have the potential of creating competing structures within the state. 
Such competing structures can be terrorist groups which organize violence with the 
goal of affecting politics (Scmid 2004: 200). Crime syndicates, warlords and 
equivalents are other organizations that have this potential in order to secure its 
interests by organizing violence. These kinds of violence are not only organized, but 
also hold the potential to undermine states ability to control their territory, which is a 
prerequisite for a state in order to claim monopoly on legitimate force (Weber 
1991/1921: 78). PSCs and PMCs also have the potential to make the role of the state 
in security matters deprivileged (Singer 2005: 19). However, if it’s taken as a starting 
point that PSCs and PMCs are given permission by the US to exercise violence, it is 
also unclear if PSCs and PMCs threaten the US monopoly per se. In cases where the 
companies exercise violence, it may be interpreted to suggest that it comes from the 
single center of the state (Jachtenfuchs 2005: 37). Hence, this will be interpreted to 
suggest that there is no breach of state monopoly of violence as long as those actors 
performing violence is given permission to do it.  
As a result, this thesis will interpret monopoly in a non economic fashion and hence, 
not support the view that PSC and PMC involvement in the security sphere destroys 
state monopoly on legitimate force per se.  
3.3.4 The Functional Component of Monopolization  
Weber’s view that modern states should hold a monopoly of violence also suggested 
a reorganization of it (Kössler 2003: 19). This reorganization is visible from a 
historical perspective as states abandoned the use of privateers, buccaneers, 
mercantile companies and mercenaries as accepted representatives of state violence, 
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and substituted these private actors with citizens’ or professional armies and national 
police forces.  
The functional component to the monopolization of violence thus suggests that states 
must have the ability and capacity to pacify its citizens and to defend them from 
outside threats. This suggests that states must have proper institutions able and skilled 
enough to deal with those posing threats to its territory both externally and within. 
The success of the Napoleonic conscripted mass army in the Battle of Jena against 
Prussian forces largely made up of non Prussians may be taken as a historical 
evidence for the capacity and capability held by an army made up of citizens (Smith 
2005: 45). Hence, it may thus be argued that monopolization of violence also implied 
expectancy of functional gain. 
It may therefore be argued that the provision and production of security which is the 
responsibility of the state that has managed to monopolize violence, is also dependent 
on core functional abilities states must have in order to survive. This argument bases 
itself on the notion that pacification of citizens or competing structures must include 
state capability and ability to do this. Also the defending of states citizens from 
outside and inside threats suggest that states need capacity and ability to undertake 
this task. According to Rotberg (2004: 3), it is this ability to produce security that is 
the most core functional ability when different types of states are investigated. 
Monopolization of legitimate force therefore becomes a matter of functional capacity 
and capability for states.  
Contemporary PSCs and PMCs hired by the US have the capacity to involve 
themselves directly or indirectly in most areas of security provision and production 
by offering a wide range of services (Krahmann 2005: 8-9; Schreier & Caparini 2005: 
33). This implies that both PSCs and PMCs have the opportunity to affect the 
functional ability of states to produce security for their citizens if they are given 
access to these areas. If this access weakens the US ability to protect its territory and 
citizens from outside threats, it might also have consequences for the US monopoly 
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on legitimate violence. Hence, it might thus be asked whether PSCs and PMCs 
should be considered to increase or weaken the functional ability of the US. 
In order to be able to investigate the overarching research question, a hypothesis 
focusing on the potential PSCs and PMCs have to affect functional ability of the US 
to produce security for its citizens will be formulated. Because the US has a long 
history of relying on PSCs and PMCs, this thesis will take as a starting point that the 
involvement of these companies will have a positive effect on the US ability to 
produce security. The hypothesis also supports itself on the fact that that contractors 
are seen as a central part of the total force designated to answer to the new security 
goals of the US and a central component in the overall war fighting capability of the 
US (QDR 2006: 16, 87). 
H1: PSCs and PMCs hired by the US should be regarded to increase the functional 
ability of the US to produce security for its citizens against outside threats and 
therefore do not threaten the US monopoly on legitimate force. 
In order to illuminate aspects of the hypothesis, the focus will be on the effects PSCs 
and PMCs might have on the US functional ability to produce security for its citizens.  
This thesis will support itself on the view of Singer (2003: 170) who argues that the 
ability a state has to raise, maintain and operate a military force as the “ultimate 
symbol of sovereignty”. Particular focus will be given to how these companies affect 
the military capacity and capability of the US to produce security.  
3.4 Sources of Legitimacy 
A closer investigation of legitimacy will here be undertaken as this thesis bases itself 
on the Weberian definition of the modern state, which includes this term. The 
importance of including and clarifying legitimacy is done in order to make it possible 
to investigate if the PSCs and PMCs should be considered as legitimate actors when 
they are contracted by the US.  
 39
Both Grafstein (1981: 456) and Jachtenfuchs (2005: 38) draw on the Weberian 
understanding of legitimacy and argue that the state finds its legitimacy rooted in how 
the citizens perceive the state. This view is much in line with the notion that 
“legitimacy is rooted in opinion” (Tucker & Hendrickson 2004). Hence, state 
violence is legitimate as long as the citizens believe it to be so (Jachtenfuchs 2005: 
38). How the citizens and the US perceive PSCs and PMCs can thus be considered 
part of how these companies can get legitimacy.  
It should not be ignored that Weber has gotten much critique for his concept of 
legitimacy. One such critique suggest that Weber’s understanding of what legitimacy 
is, “is indifferent to the reasons which may exist for approving or disapproving of 
system of government” and legitimacy thus become “ethical[ly] unacceptable” 
(Barker 1990: 25). Furthermore, it has also been claimed that Weber’s understanding 
of legitimacy is “morally and relative and theoretically irresponsible” and is “simply 
a matter of fact” (ibid.). However, in defense of the Weberian understanding of 
legitimacy, it has been suggested that legitimacy is “a contributor to domination”, and 
“a justification of it”, thus giving legitimacy the role as a condition for the exercise of 
power and “a physical condition for the enjoyment of it” (Barker 1990: 59). Hence, it 
may be argued that legitimacy can serve as a strong source where PSCs and PMCs 
can get their existence and involvement in the security sphere justified. 
3.4.1 Pathways to Legitimacy for PSCs and PMCs  
According to Tucker & Hendrickson (2004), in the US, legitimacy is retrieved from 
decisions made by rightful authority, which does not breach with legal or moral 
norms. This approach is somewhat similar to Clark (2005: 4) who argues that 
legitimacy comes from values inherent in norms such as “legality, morality and 
constitutionality”.  
Føllesdal (2004: 7- 9) for his part provides four conceptions of legitimacy. These are 
labeled legitimacy as legality, legitimacy as problem solving, legitimacy as 
compliance, and legitimacy as justifiability. The first one, legitimacy as legality 
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underlines the importance of laws as a source of legitimacy (ibid.8). Such an 
approach is much in line with Clark (2005: 4) who also emphasized legality as an 
important source of legitimacy on the international stage. This thesis will interpret 
these contributions to suggest that if the US has laws that are able to grasp the 
activities and regulating PSCs and PMCs, they may be seen as a source of legitimacy 
for the companies. The importance of laws is also discovered with Jachtenfuchs 
(2005: 37-38) who emphasized that states in the process of monopolizing violence 
would define the use of force by legal rules. The third one, legitimacy as problem 
solving stresses that something may be seen as legitimate if it is interpreted to 
represent a valuable alternative to the solving of a given problem (Føllesdal 2004: 7). 
This may be seen in connection to the notion that legitimacy is rooted in the “success 
of state institutions in cultivating and meeting expectations” (Fraser 1978: 118), 
which may be taken to underline the importance of problem solving related to 
legitimacy. Hence, it may be argued that PSCs and PMCs may be considered 
legitimate in the US if they are seen as the solution or part of it in solving security 
related challenges by the public.  
The second and fourth conceptions (Føllesdal 2004: 7-8), legitimacy as compliance 
and as justifiability may be seen in connection. Both can be interpreted to suggest that 
legitimacy is connected to the considerations people make in order to see something 
as legitimate or not. However, the difference between the two conceptions should 
also be noticed as compliance suggests that people will comply either because they 
fear the consequences of not complying or because they are passive and do not care 
(ibid. 8.). Furthermore, legitimacy as justifiability for its part suggest that people 
intuitively sees something just and fair (ibid. 8). It may be argued that the two 
conceptions may be connected to how legitimacy has been associated with the 
opinion of the public and their subjective feelings as it was outlined by Tucker & 
Hendrickson (2004) and Fraser (1978: 118). The view linking Weber’s understanding 
of legitimacy to the will of the demos should also be considered as important here 
(Jachtenfuchs 2005: 38). 
 41
The starting point for investigation will be that the PSCs and PMCs should be 
considered legitimate actors in the US. This view roots itself on two aspects. Firstly, 
on a general level PMCs and PSCs “are having an apparent de facto legitimacy” 
because they are used by governments (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 83). Support for 
this view is also discovered with the long history the US has of using PSCs and 
PMCs (Kidwell 2005: 1). It may thus be argued that these companies indeed hold 
what Barker (1990: 31-33) refers to as a habitual legitimacy thus suggesting that 
hiring these companies is merely routine business. This is the starting point for the 
hypothesis which suggests that: 
H2: The PMCs and PSCs are considered legitimate actors within the security sphere 
in the US and therefore do not threaten the US monopoly on legitimate force. 
In order to investigate this hypothesis the conception of legal legitimacy will be 
investigated focusing on both the international and US national level. The three other 
conceptions provided by Føllesdal (2004: 7-9) will be connected to public opinion. 
This is undertaken in order to include those theoretical contributions who argue that 
public opinion and legitimacy are closely connected. 
3.5 Defining Political Control   
The connection between political control and the US monopoly on legitimate force is 
rooted in the belief that lack of political control would suggest that PSCs and PMCs 
operate as a competitive structure of organized violence within or from the territory 
of the US. Hence, the ability to exercise political control over PSCs and PMCs might 
be taken as an indication of the position of the US monopoly on legitimate force. A 
question is thus whether the US has the ability to exercise oversight and control over 
the PSCs and PMCs they hire. An important contribution focusing on this is the one 
of Avant (2005: 40) who combines three dimensions to investigate whether PSCs and 
PMCs challenges political control of force. The three dimensions are labeled a 
functional, political and social.  
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3.5.1 The Functional Dimension 
Functional control of force is measuring how successful the military can deploy force 
in order to defend the interest of the state (Avant 2005: 40). Another and important 
aspect of this is to take into account the relative costs of using PSCs and PMCs (ibid. 
43). Hence, functional control of force is both a matter of whether the PSCs and 
PMCs affects the ability of the US militaries to deploy force, and how able the US is 
at monitoring the costs related to the hiring of PSCs and PMCs.  
3.5.2 The Political Dimension 
The second dimension, the political one, emphasizes that the projection of force in 
order to protect state interests should be done within existing political structures 
(Avant 2005: 40). If changes in political control occur, it can be identified by 
redistribution in power amongst institutions, individuals and organizations (ibid. 42). 
Hence, this dimension opens up for an investigation of whether the PSCs and PMCs 
have gotten more to say in the decision process in matters concerning security 
production in the US.  
3.5.3 The Social Dimension 
The third dimension, the social one, focuses on whether militaries operations and 
behavior are integrated within accepted social values in the society (Avant 2005: 40-
41). This opens up for an investigation of whether PSCs and PMCs hired by the US 
adhere to norms and values seen as important to the US.  
3.5.4 Identifying Problems Related to the Exercise of Political 
Control 
Practical problems related to the exercise of political control of PSCs and PMCs can 
be illuminated by agency-theory. This theoretical contribution is useful when it is 
investigated whether bureaucracies will or can respond to political control (Whitford 
2002: 168), but it can also be applied to investigate how for example contractual 
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arrangements and the delegation of tasks introduce new challenges to the ability for 
states to exercise political control over PSCs and PMCs. This view roots itself in the 
notion that states delegate a certain responsibility to these companies when they are 
hired. Such delegation of responsibility takes place when the principal does not have 
the capacity, competence or collective will to perform the given task (Rasch 2000: 
68-69). This underlines the usefulness of agency-theory as PSCs and PMCs often are 
hired by the US for one or several of these reasons. Agency-theory assumes that 
agents often have skills and capabilities the principal does not have, which also suits 
the PSCs and PMCs well as these are often believed to be better at fulfilling certain 
security providing related tasks. PSCs or PMCs might thus embark on what Bjørn 
Erik Rasch (2000: 70-73) describes as shirking behavior, which occurs when the 
agent intentionally avoids doing what it is delegated to do. The possibility for this is 
rooted in the inherently different interest held by principal and agents (Rasch 2000: 
69). PMCs and PSCs obviously have different interests from the state if it is accepted 
that they are profit driven entities. As a result of possible diverging interests, two 
agent problems might occur (Rasch 2000: 71). These include the provision of 
asymmetrical information, which refers to the belief that agents might not wish to 
share information it has access to with the principal, for example due to strategic 
reasons (Rasch 2000: 71). Hidden actions occur as a result of the principal’s lack of 
being able to monitor the behavior of the agent (ibid. 72).  
The starting point for the hypothesis formulated is to investigate the US ability to 
exercise political control over the PSCs and PMCs after 2001.  
H3: The US has the ability to exercise political control over the PMCs and PSCs they 
hire and therefore the US monopoly on legitimate violence is not threatened. 
In order to investigate the H3 along the three dimensions provided by Avant (2005: 
41-43) this chapter will start by investigating functional control. It will also explore 
different aspects of the outsourcing in the US by focusing on the competition between 
potential agents, the policy of outsourcing, strategy concerning outsourcing, and its 
ability to supervise the agents it is awarding contracts. The political dimension will in 
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this thesis be investigated by focusing on whether the relationship between the 
legislative and executive branches in the US has changed as a result of the use of 
PSCs and PMCs. Central issues here will include transparency, the addition of new 
actors, and the issue of the altering of resources (Avant 2005: 43). The social 
dimension will be investigated by focusing on whether the PSCs and PMCs have 
adhered to social norms and values important in the US. Agency-theory will be 
applied along these dimensions when possible. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided a theoretical framework that will be applied as a tool to 
investigate the overarching research question. The theoretical framework is designed 
to make it possible to investigate functional consequences related to US ability to 
produce security, whether the companies should be considered legitimate actors and 
finally whether the US is able to exercise political control over PSCs and PMCs. The 
findings in this chapter have led to the creation of three hypotheses’ that will be used 
to structure the forthcoming analysis into three parts. Together, they are intended to 
investigate the overarching research question which was formulated as “How does the 
use of Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies by the US affect 
its monopoly on the use of legitimate force?”.  
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4. Investigating Functional Effects 
4.1  Introduction 
The US is today the world’s only superpower (Avant 2005: 113). According to 
Preston (2005: 36) as of 2005, the US had “260 000 soldiers forwarded in more than 
120 nations”, which made the US soldier “very busy”. Critical voices have drawn 
attention to the US militaries and their lack of proper military equipment, combined 
with the exhausting of their troops, which has come as a result of heavy commitments 
abroad (NSAG report 2006: 1). This is exemplified by the mobilizing of 95% of US 
National Guard Units since 9/11 2001, combined with failures to recruit new soldiers 
to its armed forces (NSAG report 2006: 2). The PSCs and PMCs for their part have 
been seen as representing easy access to skills and knowledge that the US either do 
not have or have to little of (GAO 1994: 2). The hypothesis in this chapter has been 
formulated as: PSCs and PMCs hired by the US should be regarded to increase the 
functional ability of the US to produce security for its citizens against outside threats 
and therefore do not threaten the US monopoly on legitimate force. Consequently, in 
order to illuminate the overarching research question, it is of importance to establish 
whether PSCs and PMCs indeed might be considered as a functional asset for the US 
is producing security for its citizens.  
4.2 Structure of Chapter 
This chapter will investigate whether PSCs and PMCs hired by the US indeed add to 
the functional ability of producing security for its citizens. First, the chapter will 
investigate whether in house capability is lost. Potential brain draining will also be 
investigated here. Secondly, it will be investigated if PSCs and PMCs add to the 
functional ability of the US by improving flexibility to respond to security challenges. 
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Thirdly, this chapter will investigate whether the US has become dependent upon 
their PSCs and PMCs 
4.3 Affecting In House Capacity 
In order to be able to produce security, the US needs institutions with the capability 
to do so. A negative interpretation of the functional consequences of relying too 
extensively on PSCs and PMCs suggests that the US militaries may lose the ability to 
undertake even the most basic in house tasks (Singer 2003: 160). Losing this ability 
may have serious functional consequences, as it in a worst case scenario may deprive 
the US from being able to produce security. A related consequence may thus be that 
it affects the US held monopoly on legitimate force. The US, has contracted out 
several in house tasks such as maintenance of military equipment, and supply 
services. Furthermore, it has also been noticed that in camp tasks, such as the 
building and running of military camps has been extensively outsourced and 
privatized in the US (Kidwell 2003: 30).  
The trend of privatizing and outsourcing almost every aspect of supportive roles of 
security production has been so extensive that concerns were raised already in the 
1990s, asking whether the US military would be able to provide essential emergency 
services, which were seen as necessary to answer to potential threats and security 
challenges (Singer 2003: 162). There are obvious negative functional consequences 
related to this concern, and it suggests that the extensive use of PSCs and PMCs may 
have deprived the US from being able to cope with the uncertainties that emerge in 
war or conflict. This may be considered to challenge functional ability to produce 
security. In turn this may be interpreted to weaken the hypothesis investigated in this 
chapter, which suggests that the PSCs and PMCs added to the functional ability to 
produce security. 
One example that seems to confirm the worries stated in the 1990s has been identified 
by Condon (2006: 160). He noticed that KBR refused to drive supply convoys during 
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the summer of 2004 in Iraq, because the company did not see the security measures 
for its drivers as good enough. This happened as the insurgents focused on targeting 
supply convoys driving into Iraq from Kuwait, and in the end hampered the US 
militaries’ freedom of movement due to lack of fuel (Condon 2006: 160). In turn this 
led the US militaries, which had shrunk its Combat Support Service (CSS) units by 
37% as a consequence of the outsourcing to KBR, to redirect military forces to baby-
sit the KBR convoys (ibid). The example underlines the potential functional 
consequences of not having soldiers that are able to fill in the privatized voids (Singer 
2003: 163). Hence, it may be argued that by contracting out supply tasks to KBR, and 
downsizing own CSS capacity, the US deprived itself from having proper access to a 
core functional capability necessary to conduct military operations thus affecting the 
ability to produce security. An argument supporting the notion of functional loss in 
this regard is underlined when it is taken into account that supply services is the most 
important component needed for an army in order to function well (Van Creveld in 
Kidwell 2003: 9). From a purely functional perspective, emphasizing the need for the 
US to have the ability to produce security in order to be able to monopolize legitimate 
violence, the outsourcing of US military CSS capacity may thus be interpreted to 
have serious negative implications for the hypothesis investigated in this chapter. 
Hence, it may be argued that the US may have jeopardized its functional ability to 
produce security when it outsourced military related supply functions.  
Another example of consequences for in house capacity related to functional ability 
to produce security is discovered in relation to the outsourcing of military equipment 
maintenance to PMSCs. A GAO report (2003: 8) did for example uncover that the 
US Air Force (USAF) had sent its Predators, or Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs), to 
combat units relying one hundred percent on PMSCs to maintain its data link system. 
Hence, the USAF did not have in house capacity in the first place, but still 
implemented the new weapons system. This illustrates the challenge lack of in house 
capacity represent in relation to the US functional ability to produce security. Hence, 
if those units using UAVs are working in operations where frontlines are fluid, the 
PMSC maintaining the drones may be targeted for attacks and choose to leave the 
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battlefield. The potential negative effect related to the hypothesis investigated in this 
chapter, may thus be that those units using UAVs may be left without important 
surveillance capacity, which again may affect their effectiveness on the battlefield. 
Another discovery in relation to loss of in house capacity has been that DOD has 
failed to address the issue of what services provided by PSCs and PMCs it sees as 
essential (GAO 2003: 15). It may be argued that the negative functional 
consequences of failing at this may lead to contracting out tasks that if lost, may 
hamper the functional ability to produce security. This point is further underlined by 
the fact that DOD have had little or no backup planning if those companies 
contracted to fulfill certain essential in house tasks are failing at it (GAO 2003: 16). 
When challenges related to contractual relationships between the companies and the 
US, an issue that will be investigated in a later chapter, combined with the heavy 
involvement in SASO and MOOTW operations is taken into account, it may be 
argued that relying on contractors without any backup plans seems rather hazardous 
from a functional perspective.  Indeed, this point is underlined by the GAO (2003: 
17-18), who noticed that some US military missions abroad were endangered if the 
PMCs and PSCs involved left. Again, this may be interpreted to indicate that US 
functionality related to the production of security may be considered vulnerable by 
the extensive use of PSCs and PMCs. It may also be argued that this represent a 
challenge to the hypothesis in this chapter, which suggested that the companies 
should be considered to increase the functional ability of the US to produce security 
for its citizens against outside threats. 
The findings made by GAO (2003) may easily be interpreted to suggest that the US, 
as a consequence of unstructured implementation of its own strategy of using PSCs 
and PMCs as a part of the total force, has deprived itself from the access to 
knowledge that is needed to undertake core in house tasks. This may again be taken 
to indicate that the US sometimes jeopardizes its functional capability and capacity to 
produce security for its citizens. Taking the hypothesis investigated in this chapter 
into account, it may thus be questioned whether PSCs and PMCs indeed should be 
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considered functional assets. The consequence may be that instead of adding 
functional capability, the PSCs and PMCs sometimes deprives the US of it. There are 
obvious negative consequences for the supposed monopoly of legitimate violence 
held by the US related to this. This can also be taken to suggest a weakening of the 
hypothesis investigated in this chapter.     
4.3.1 Brain Draining 
Another aspect of the potential loss of competency is related to those worrying that 
the PSCs and PMCs are draining especially militaries and law enforcement agencies 
for experienced personnel (NSAG 2006: 2). PSCs and PMCs are often believed to 
recruit extensively amongst ex soldiers with considerable experience, knowledge and 
skills offering them presumed high salaries (Singer 2003: 76). From a market 
perspective it may be argued that there is a kind of logic to this, as supply and 
demand may play a role. The negative functional consequences related to brain 
draining suggest that the US may lose skilled personnel to the PSCs and PMCs, thus 
weakening the ability of the US to produce security. This view support itself on the 
fact that the US has stretched its forces globally and is simultaneously experiencing 
problems with the recruitment of new soldiers in order to fill in the voids (NSAG 
2006: 1).  
To illustrate the potential functional loss by brain drain, the active recruiting of 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the US by PSCs and PMCs should be noticed. 
Much concern was raised on this subject in the US especially after the US led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (NSAG 2006: 2). SOF units are highly valued by the US and 
considered as an important component to battle future threats (QDR 2006: 43- 44). 
Furthermore, they have been given much priority in order to make them more able to 
deal with challenges related to this (Kensinger Jr. 2005: 127). US SOF personnel may 
thus be said to play an important role in relation to the capacity and ability that the 
US sees as important in order to respond to security threats such as terrorism. Hence, 
it may be argued that if the PSCs and PMCs are draining the US for experienced SOF 
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personnel, it also suggests a functional weakening of the US ability to produce 
security.  
A GAO report (2005: 35-39) concerning the use of PSCs in Iraq, did however not 
identify enough evidence to establish a connection between PSCs and PMCs’ 
demand for ex SOF personnel and attrition rates amongst them in the US. Neither did 
it established a relation between attrition of US military personnel more generally and 
the PSCs and PMCs in the 2001-2004 period (ibid.). Instead, the report uncovered 
that for example ex SOF personnel would quit their job in their SOF unit respective, 
in order to take work for other US governmental agencies that needed their expertise 
in the wake of 9.11.2001 (GAO 2005: 43). This may be taken as evidence that blurs 
the notion that PSCs and PMCs are stealing the brains of the US militaries. The 
finding is important as it may be interpreted to blur the view that PSCs or PMCs are 
sucking the US authorities empty of important talent and brains. Instead, it may be 
argued that PSCs and PMCs from this approach do not weaken the state institutions 
in the US, which are involved in security production. 
4.4 Adding Flexibility to Functional Ability 
4.4.1 PSCs and PMCs as Proxies 
There are several examples that the US has either allowed PSCs and PMCs to export 
their services or hired them to forward US interests, thus making them proxies. One 
known example of the first is Vinell Corporation’s training of Saudi Arabian Security 
forces, which started back in the 1970s, and is still present today even with military 
presence in the country as well (Vinell Website). The motivation for this was to 
connect the strategically important country closer to the US. Because it may have 
been considered to politically controversial to send military troops to train Saudi 
forces, the US allowed Vinnell Corporation to sign a contract with the Saudi Arabian 
King (Singer 2003: 13). PSCs and PMCs may thus function as a tool that assist in the 
building of relations between the US and countries it considers as important in order 
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to increase own security. Indeed, it may be argued that the above mentioned example 
support the notion that PSCs and PMCs represent an “alternative approach” for the 
solving of US security needs (Smith 2002: 114). The potential functional flexibility 
related to security production may also be seen in the notion that PMCs have the 
potential to participate in everything from UN operations and humanitarian missions 
to the handling of challenges represented by international criminal networks, 
terrorists and other forms of international crime (Smith 2002-03: 115). Hence, the 
notion that the companies amongst some policy makers are considered to be a more 
flexible foreign political tool in the toolbox should be noticed (Avant 2005: 152). 
Based on this, it may thus be argued that there are initial supports for the view that 
PSCs and PMCs improve the US functional ability to produce security for its citizens. 
Some negative consequences related to the US functional ability to produce security 
may however be identified. One is that PSCs and PMCs sometimes are considered 
less prone to changes in political goals (Avant 2005: 154).  A perceived consequence 
may thus be that a contracted PSC or PMC working as a proxy for the US may hurt 
the attempts to produce security rather than supporting them. One example is the 
notion that a US based PMC was contracted to train certain tribes in Afghanistan 
after the invasion. The problem was however that this tribe later proved hostile to the 
Karzai government. Despite of this, the PMC still fulfilled its contract (Avant 2005: 
123). The flexibility PSCs and PMCs may represent may therefore also be considered 
to be a danger as it may lead US decision makers to make to rash decisions that may 
hurt US security in the long run. Another argument that emphasizes a pitfall 
concerning the use of PSCs and PMCs as proxies, suggest that they may undermine 
the need for building alliances (Singer 2003: 179). By having the ability to send a 
PSC or PMC, the US may not need to consider sending military troops designated to 
train or assist foreign militaries at all. The importance of military aid programs, 
sending US militaries to train foreign militaries have been emphasized as “a vital 
ingredient in the building of strong alliances” (ibid.). PSCs and PMCs represent the 
ability to circumvent this practice, which again may be seen as weakening the long 
term security production of the US. This may also be seen in connection to the ability 
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of conducting future combined military operations between US militaries and its 
allies. It may be argued that the only way different nations’ forces can cooperate is by 
practicing at it. PSCs and PMCs may harm this ability when they are used as proxies 
to train foreign forces, as they may be considered a short term less costly alternative 
both economically and politically.  Hence, short term assessments concerning 
political costs and urgent needs may harm the functional ability of the US to produce 
security with its allies in the long run. The above stated arguments thus weaken the 
notion that PSCs and PMCs is a functional asset only, when used as proxies. 
4.4.2 Avoiding Force Cap 
Another aspect here is the fact that the US militaries today have military presences in 
several geographical areas where the size of US troop deployment is regulated either 
by law, bilateral or multilateral agreements often described as force cap (GAO 2003: 
8). Such regulations might be interpreted to hamper the flexibility of the US forces 
put under force cap, as fewer operational troops available also suggest less functional 
ability to respond to local security threats or challenges. Initially this may be seen as 
weakening the US ability to produce security. However, this problem has effectively 
been circumvented by contracting out support functions (GAO 2003: 2).  The tasks 
that have been contracted out include “a wide variety of services from food, laundry, 
and recreation to maintenance of military’s most advanced equipment” (GAO 2003: 
6). More specifically, PSCs has and PMCs have for example been hired to provide 
security and firefighters in Kosovo (GAO 2003: 8). This practice has indeed opened 
up for the possibility for the US to have a steady representation of combat troops 
around the globe, also in areas where force cap is in effect.  Hence, using PSCs and 
PMCs to do these tasks may be interpreted to add to the US functional ability to 
produce security. It may however also be argued that the functional gain earned by 
using PSCs and PMCs in such tasks have also been a reason for the depriving of in 
house capacity of US militaries. Because the US has forces stationed globally, the 
extensive use of PMCs and PSCs filling the voids may make the US over dependent 
on its contractors from a long term perspective. This may suggest a weakening of 
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functional ability to produce security if a conflict arises and the contractors choose to 
leave the conflict zone or battlefield. If the companies would choose to leave, it may 
indeed be considered to represent a challenge to the notion of functional gain. A 
related issue here suggests that if the US relies on the companies in a longer time 
frame, it may lead to a downsizing of own in house capacity that in the end may ruin 
the expertise and ability of the institutions that have been designated to participate in 
security production. This may be considered to weaken the hypothesis investigated in 
this chapter. 
4.4.3 Quick Response Capacity 
The last aspect that will be considered in relation to flexibility is the notion that PSCs 
and PMCs need a shorter period of mobilizing than militaries (Schreier & Caparini 
2005: 80). Support for this view is discovered when it is taken into account that PSCs 
and PMCs managed to fulfill an estimated 2800 contracts in Iraq from 2003-2005 
(Holmqvist 2005: 31). One example is related to the outsourcing of training of 
foreign police and military forces. PSCs and PMCs are often believed to have the 
ability to provide experienced employees on a short notice. One example of this was 
Vinnell Corporation’s ability to provide instructors with area knowledge for the new 
Iraqi police and militaries (Avant 2005: 121-123). The ability of the companies to 
design their contribution in order to fulfill a given contract on short notice is perhaps 
one of their greatest advantages. For example, area and linguistic knowledge are 
things that PSCs and PMCs often are considered to be able to provide more quickly 
than the armed forces (ibid. 123). Initially, the flexibility of the companies may be 
interpreted to represent a functional asset for the US, as they can design dedicated 
force contributions to unique missions on a short term notice. This may indeed make 
the US able to respond quickly to new security threats and it may be suggested that 
this adds to the functional ability of the US to produce security. 
 It is however also possible to argue that the many examples of negative behavior of 
PSCs and PMCs, for example in Iraq, underline the potential dangers that using these 
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companies may have for long term security goals. It has for example been noticed 
that when PSCs escort assets from the Green Zone to Baghdad International Airport 
(BIAP), winning the heart and minds of the people, is the least of concerns for the 
PSD on the road (Pelton in Shadow Company – The Movie 2006). Indeed,  MOOTW 
or SASO where winning hearts and minds is seen important to reach long term goals, 
aggressive acting PSCs may hurt these efforts. Hence, even though it may be argued 
that PSCs and PMCs represent a functional asset to the US, because of their ability to 
provide designed solutions to most security challenges or security producing related 
areas, the warning forwarded by Avant (2005: 59) who suggests that hiring PSCs and 
PMCs results in short term maintaining of goals should be noticed as important. A 
consequence of this may be that the US militaries and other institutions involved in 
security production may not see it as necessary to obtain certain kinds of knowledge 
because they know that the companies can provide it quicker.  
Again, from a short term perspective the functional consequences may be preferable, 
but from a long time perspective relying on the companies may hamper US efforts to 
obtain own capacity and capability. Hence, it may thus be argued that PSCs and 
PMCs provide a valuable alternative for the US because of the expertise and 
flexibility they represent. It may thus be argued that the PSCs and PMCs may 
increase flexibility of the US to be able to respond quicker to potential threats. The 
potential negative long term consequences do however blur the notion that there are 
only positive functional associations with the use of these companies. Hence, if 
taking a short term perspective, it may be argued that the hypothesis is supported, but 
this may not be true from a longer perspective as the companies may undermine the 
functional ability of the US to produce security for its citizens. 
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4.5  “..The US cannot go to war without contractors”6  
The clearest evidence of functional loss connected to the production of security 
would be if the US has become unable to produce security without its contractors. 
Hence, if the above quotation is true, the consequences for the functional ability of 
the US should be considered as grave. The issue is therefore whether the heavy 
involvement of PSCs and PMCs in the production of security in the US has also led 
the US to become dependent on the PSCs and PMCs. If this is true, it would suggest a 
serious challenge to the hypothesis investigated in this chapter.  
An indication of US dependency upon the companies may be that PSCs and PMCs 
are seen as an integral part of the total military force in the US (QDR 2006: 75). It 
may also be argued that the extensive use of PSCs and PMCs that surfaced after the 
9/11 2001 US military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq is a result of a broader 
initiative to make more use of these companies. The GAO report (1994: 22-25) which 
emphasized the positive economic prospects of allowing more private involvement in 
the US supports this notion. What seems to support the impression of US dependency 
on its PSCs and PMCs, is that it has been noticed that “even the US army has 
concluded that in the future it will require contract personnel, even in the close 
fighting area, to keep its most modern systems functioning” (Adams quoted in Wulf 
2005: 181). Examples of this include the maintenance of different helicopters such as 
the UH – 60 Blackhawk and AH – 64 Apache, the Guardrail surveillance aircraft and 
advanced communications equipment (GAO 2003: 8-9). Furthermore, US reliance on 
high technological equipment implemented as a result of the RMA, has made worried 
comments suggesting that “sometimes the people who built it are the only ones who 
know how to fix it” (Singer 2003: 64). This may be taken to underline the vulnerable 
position the US is in. Hence, this may thus be interpreted to suggest a weakening of 
                                              
6 (Avant 2005: 115) 
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the US functional ability to produce security if it is accepted that air capacity is an 
important contributor in military operations. 
This may indeed be seen as weakening the hypothesis investigated in this chapter, as 
it suggests that the US would experience serious problems related to the production 
of security if they had to do it without those PMSCs contracted to maintain it. Also 
the view that US armed forces will need “huge levels of battlefield support from 
private firms” (Singer 2003: 63), underlines the extremely important role PSCs and 
PMCs have come to play in security production in the US. The earlier mentioned 
example of KBR and its halting of driving convoy’s in Iraq in 2004 (Condon 2006: 
160), which hampered US militaries operational abilities can be considered to 
underline this point.   
The above quotation also illuminates another important aspect. The US may have to 
rely upon their PSCs and PMCs not only in times of peace, but also when they fight 
wars. This may be considered as a serious change from the initial expectations of 
what tasks PSCs and PMCs should undertake. Furthermore, it emphasizes that the US 
functional ability to produce security may have become more dependent on the 
companies. This thesis will support itself on those who argue that the realities of PSC 
and PMC involvement in the US today is a far cry away from the initial US doctrine, 
which emphasized that the US militaries should only privatize those areas which are 
not considered “emergency – essential support functions” and should not affect 
wartime operations or impair with militaries ability to mobilize (Singer 2003: 162). 
Hence, this blurs the notion that the tasks that has been outsourced or privatized have 
been out of conscious choice. Furthermore, even if hiring PSCs and PMCs has been 
considered part of an overall strategy of shrinking the size of the state, there are signs 
that the potential negative functional consequences related to this have either been 
ignored or not assessed properly. The importance of this related to the thesis 
investigated, is thus that the extensive use of PSCs and PMCs have had some 
unfortunate effects on the US functional ability to produce security. This may be 
considered as a serious weakening of the hypothesis investigated in this chapter.  
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4.6 Summary 
The findings in this chapter suggest that the functional consequences that the US has 
experienced when hiring PSCs and PMCs should be considered as mixed. On the 
positive side, flexibility, easier access to skills and knowledge and short term gain 
should be noticed. The negative effects include loss of in house capacity as a result of 
failure to identify essential tasks. The findings in this chapter thus suggest that the US 
are about to jeopardize its future capacity to produce security. This suggests a serious 
weakening of the hypothesis investigated in this chapter.  
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5. The Quest for Legitimacy 
5.1  Introduction 
A central issue concerning PSCs and PMCs and their potential effect on the US 
monopoly on legitimate force is whether they should or can be considered as 
legitimate actors. Militaries are often considered to be legitimate because they are 
motivated by ideals such as patriotism (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 29). PSCs and 
PMCs for their part are considered to be profit driven businesses, private entities, 
believed to be true to their board and stockholders only (Singer 2003: 47). This may 
thus be considered to affect whether the companies can be deemed legitimate actors. 
The hypothesis investigated in this chapter, which supported itself on those who 
argued that PSCs and PMCs may be considered legitimate as a result of habit (Barker 
1990:31-33) or de facto legitimacy (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 83) was formulated as 
“The PMCs and PSCs are considered legitimate actors within the security sphere in 
the US, and therefore do not threaten the US monopoly on legitimate force”. This 
chapter will investigate if this is true, in order to illuminate the overarching research 
question. 
5.2 Structure of Chapter 
This chapter will start by approaching the question of whether the PSCs and PMCs 
should be considered legitimate actors, by investigating if the companies are legally 
legitimate (Føllesdal 2004: 7). Both the international and national legal levels will be 
investigated here, because Clark (2005: 5) sees these levels as connected. The next 
part of the chapter focuses on whether the public in the US perceives the PSCs and 
PMCs as problem solvers, related to production of security and lowering of political 
costs. This is done to cover legitimacy as problem solving (Føllesdal 2004: 7). 
Emphasizing that public opinion is an important source of legitimacy the focus will 
 59
be on public opinion when the conceptions of legitimacy are investigated, except the 
one of legality.  
5.3 Legitimacy as Legality 
5.3.1 The International Level 
The international legal frameworks that have been developed in order to grasp non 
state involvement have traditionally focused on mercenary activity. This started in 
1949 with the Geneva Conventions giving mercenaries Prisoner of War status if part 
of a legally defined armed force (Singer 2004: 526).  Later, in 1968, the UN passed a 
resolution that in 1970 led to the Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst States also known as the 
1970 Declaration (Singer 2004: 527).  Later, the Additional Protocol I of the 
International humanitarian law, the 1977 African Unity Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa and the Article 2 of the 1989 UN Convention 
on mercenaries were established (Cameron 2006: 577, 580; Singer 2004: 528-529).   
In order to obtain legal legitimacy (Føllesdal 2004: 7), it may thus be argued that the 
activity of PSCs and PMCs should be grasped by these international legal 
frameworks. Related to whether the employees can be classified as mercenaries based 
on those conventions criminalizing mercenary activity, it has been noticed that 
existing frameworks are inadequate (Cameron 2006: 577- 578). However, it is also 
argued here that a case by case approach has to be undertaken. This may be 
interpreted to suggest that the existing international legal framework may grasp PSC 
and PMC legitimacy in some cases. Furthermore, it may also be interpreted to 
suggest that PSCs and PMCs may obtain legal legitimacy when approached by 
mercenary conventions. Such a view roots itself on the notion that if employees of 
PSCs and PMCs are not considered mercenaries, the US has not breached with any 
international norm by hiring them. Such a view supports itself on the importance of 
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norms as a source of legitimacy (Barker 1990: 31-33), and that laws represent 
accepted norms and values.  
Interesting to notice in this regard is to approach this issue from the Article 47 of 
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, where Cameron (2006: 581-582) applies Sub 
Para a, b, c, d, e and f of the Article 47 of Protocol I and makes a strong case for 
classifying all citizens not from the US or other states officially involved militarily in 
Iraq as mercenaries. This interpretation suggests that the US practice of hiring PSCs 
and PMCs that are employing non US national may fail to be considered as legally 
legitimate (Cameron 2006: 582). Another consequence of this may also be that those 
PSC and PMC employees from for example the UK and U.S working in Iraq may be 
considered legally legitimate. Hence, it may thus be argued that existing legal 
international framework to a certain degree are able to grasp the activity of the PSC 
and PMCs. The weakness of this argument is however identified in the notion that 
only a case by case approach can decide this individually.  
The challenges are also underlined when all international legal frameworks that 
concern the subject are investigated. In relation to this, it has been argued that   “it is 
unlikely that […] private military companies […] can be legally regulated by existing 
international law on mercenaries” (Cameron 2006: 594). This point is also 
emphasized by Singer (2004: 532) who suggests that the activity of PSCs and PMCs 
falls outside the domain of all international legal regimes focusing on mercenarism 
that exists today. It may thus be argued that this complicates whether it may be 
argued that PSCs and PMCs should be considered as legally legitimate on the 
international level. Such a view roots itself on the notion that legal legitimacy 
presupposes that there exist laws that can be broken (Føllesdal 2004: 7). Hence, if 
existing international legal frameworks fails to address the existence of PSCs and 
PMCs, it also blurs the notion that legal legitimacy have been obtained on the 
international level.  This view also find support with Tucker & Hendrickson (2004) 
who suggests a connection between state action, laws and legitimacy. Hence, when it 
is taken into consideration that international law has been considered to primitive in 
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order to grasp the activity of PSCs and PMCs internationally (Singer 2004: 526), it 
may also be considered to weaken the assumption that the companies should be 
considered legitimate.  
As a consequence of this, the hypothesis investigated in this chapter, suggesting that 
the PSCs and PMCs should be considered legitimate actors are weakened. This view 
is underlined by Singer (2004: 533) who argues that “There are no possibilities of 
threats of company fines or dissolution, as no international laws specifically 
recognize the existence of the firms”. It may thus be argued that it is doubtful that 
PSCs and PMCs should be considered legally legitimate on the international level.  
5.3.2 The Domestic Level 
The US is considered to have one of the more developed legal approaches to the 
PSCs and PMCs (Holmqvist 2005: 27). Initially, this may thus suggest that the 
companies should be considered as legally legitimate in the US. However, this is not 
to say that weaknesses and loopholes have not been identified in the national legal 
frameworks in the US as well. One such example is the US Neutrality Act, which 
forbids the recruiting of mercenaries on its territory. However, the sale of military 
services does not fall under this law (Singer 2004: 537). Another example is the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) which is supposed to regulate 
contracts through a licensing regime when PMCs or PSCs export weapons or sell 
military related training (Singer 2004: 538; Holmqvist 2005: 51). This regime has 
however been considered as minimal and idiosyncratic which emphasizes the 
confusion concerning how the process works (Singer 2004: 539). It may thus be 
argued that the legal framework in the US concerning PSCs and PMCs that export 
their services is not able to grasp the variety of what the companies do. Hence, this 
suggests an undermining of the notion that the PSCs and PMCs should be considered 
legally legitimate. Such a view roots itself on the notion that if the US fails to apply 
laws that are intended to regulate certain aspects of what the companies do, they may 
also be considered to breach with the conception of legal legitimacy which 
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emphasizes that state action must be within nationally legally accepted boundaries 
(Føllesdal 2004:7). A related problem here surfaces if US based PSCs and PMCs 
choose to move their business abroad (Holmqvist 2005: 54). Not only would this 
suggest that controlling them would be more difficult, but it may also be considered 
to affect the legal legitimacy of hiring such companies. Such a view roots itself on the 
notion that if a given PSC or PMC choose to move abroad, the companies may be 
interpreted to avoid existing legal frameworks and procedures. The mere ability for 
PSCs and PMCs to move business to more “friendly” places may indeed be 
considered to weaken legal legitimacy, as it underlines how fragile national 
regulations are when assessing their ability to grasp PSC and PMC activity. 
Interesting to notice in this regard is that few US based PSCs or PMCs seem to have 
undertaken such actions as it has been considered to weaken prospects for future 
contracts (Avant 2005: 155).  Initially, it may however be argued that the hypothesis 
investigated in this chapter is challenged when domestic legal legitimacy is 
investigated.  
It has also been noticed that the extensive use of PSCs and PMCs abroad, for 
example in relation to the war in Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq, has contributed 
to the notion that PSCs and PMCs are running the risk of becoming extralegal in 
contemporary military operations conducted by the US (Holmqvist 2005: 27; Kidwell 
2005: 51; Singer 2004: 541). This legal vacuum did however not occur as a result of 
the absence of laws. In fact a wide array of regulations existed in 2001 when the 
extensive use of PSCs and PMCs started. Examples of the legal frameworks that 
address the activity of PSCs and PMCs in the US include the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). This framework made it possible to prosecute employees of 
PSCs and PMCs hired by DOD, when operating on foreign soil (Avant 2005: 234; 
Kidwell 2003: 51). Another example of this is the Patriot Act which extended the law 
of US Federal Act to also include crimes committed by or against US citizens on both 
lands and facilities which were designated for use by the US government (ibid.). 
Employees of PSCs and PMCs may also be held legally accountable when they are 
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working in countries with functional governments depending on the State of the 
Forces Agreement (Avant 2005: 233).  
Hence, it may be argued that the US has legal arrangements designed to grasp the 
behavior and activity of the PSCs and PMCs, thus making them punishable for 
violations. As a result, the companies may initially be considered to be legally 
legitimate when hired by the US. Such a view supports itself on the wide array of 
legal arrangements, which may suggest that the activity of PSCs and PMCs are 
considered a normal procedure not breaching with any constitutional foundations in 
the US. Again these facets are considered important in relation to legal legitimacy 
(Føllesdal 2004: 7). However, even though the existence of these laws may be 
considered to provide the US based PSCs and PMCs hired by the US with legal 
legitimacy, it is also evident that those who have focused on the shortcomings of the 
laws may be right. The weaknesses of these laws have been emphasized by Singer 
(2004: 537), who has argued that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) only 
applies to military and not civilian personnel that travel with the US militaries abroad. 
However, UCMJ seems to apply to contract personnel in times of war only, even 
though such practice for constitutional reasons may be challenged (Elsea & Serafino 
2007: 19). The answer to fill the loophole of the MEJA 2000 was to modify it. The 
problem here was however that it only covered civilian DOD contractors and not 
those employed by other agencies such as the CIA or those hired by a foreign 
government (Singer 2004: 537). Hence, initially this made for example Blackwater 
Security employees that are hired by the US State Department to provide security for 
diplomatic personnel in Iraq unaccountable to the MEJA.  
Another aspect that may be considered more systemic than legal in nature that has 
affected the legal frameworks has been the emergence of military operations such as 
SASO or military operations other than wars (MOOTW) and the US military 
involvement in these. First and foremost if the US militaries are embarking on a 
MOOTW the UCMJ does not apply to PSCs and PMCs hired by the US militaries as 
it was only applicable in times of war (Elsea & Serafino 2007: 19). Furthermore, as 
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have been pointed out by observers, even though several thousand employees of 
PSCs and PMCs have been working in for example Iraq since the invasion, very few 
have been tried for court due to unlawful behavior. It may be possible to claim that 
this is the result of the loopholes that existed in the legal frameworks applied in the 
US. Failure to grasp the activity of PSCs and PMCs would suggest that the PSCs and 
PMCs can not be considered as legally legitimate. This is because the US has failed 
to apply laws that would regulate behavior that breaches with values, norms and 
procedures that are grounded in the constitution of the US. Examples of the 
consequences of the legal loopholes are not hard to discover. Perhaps the most cited 
example to illustrate this is the Abu Ghraib prison scandal which surfaced in 2004 
and uncovered the torture and killings of Iraqi prisoners in US custody. The failure to 
hold the employees of CACI International and Titan Incorporated legally responsible 
exemplifies this. Holmqvist (2005: 27) argues that the companies were found to be 
“directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses” by the investigators which 
underlines the challenges that has surfaced as a result of the US use of PSCs and 
PMCs. To underline how complicated the legal matters were in relation to the Abu 
Ghraib scandal, it was discovered that it was not the DOD, but the National Business 
Center of the US Department of interior that had hired both CACI International and 
Titan Incorporated (ibid. 28). The Abu Ghraib example does indeed emphasize the 
weakness of the MEJA that was mentioned earlier. 
The failure to create a legal framework to grasp the activity of the PSCs and PMCs 
makes it an open question of whether these companies should be considered legally 
legitimate. This view roots itself on the notion that a connection between the laws 
that are defining when and for what purpose violence can be used, to the mere 
monopolization of legitimate violence (Jachtenfuchs 2005: 37-38). In turn the 
problems US laws have at grasping PSC and PMC activity, may be considered to 
pose a direct threat to the US monopoly on legitimate force. As a result, lack of a 
proper legal framework that covers PSCs and PMCs, may be considered as a serious 
challenge to the notion that these companies should be considered as legally 
legitimate. This view may also find support in the argument of who connect 
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legitimacy to the existence of laws that do not breach with “constitutional rules and 
procedures” (Føllesdal 2004: 8). 
5.3.3 Restructuring the National Legal Framework  
Despite of harsh and perhaps rightful critique it is important to recognize that the US 
has taken several steps to address the legal issues, especially in the wake of the 
occupation of Iraq. The question is thus whether this has been adequate enough to 
provide the PSCs and PMCs with legal legitimacy. 
One example of the attempts to address the critique is the modifications of the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA 2000). The modifications 
have broadened its reach to apply to all civilians hired by US militaries or other 
agencies when operating abroad (Elsea & Serafino 2007: 18). The consequence of 
this move has thus been that one of the criticized loopholes identified earlier has been 
tightened. Another step taken by the US has been to broaden the UCMJ to cover 
activities of PSCs and PMCs, not only when war is declared, but also in contingency 
operations (ibid. 19). If contingency operations are interpreted to include SASO and 
MOOTW, it may be interpreted to represent a strengthening of the legal framework 
that existed before 2001.  
Furthermore, Elsea & Serafino (2007: 16, 17) suggest that contractors may be 
prosecuted in Federal Courts in the US and that extraterritorial jurisdiction indeed 
applies to serious unlawful behavior such as the War Crime Act of 2006. Yet another 
sign that the US has indeed taken steps to clarify the legal status of employees of 
PSCs and PMCs hired by the US is discovered in the new interpretation of the 
international legal frameworks and conventions. This suggests that employees of 
PSCs and PMCs can be tried as criminals by an enemy government if they are 
engaged in hostilities (Elsea & Serafino 2007: 13). Another point here is that the 
Article 47 of Protocol I of the Geneva Convention has been interpreted to suggest 
that employees of PSCs and PMCs may be considered mercenaries if they are not 
national of the US or nationals of any other states involved in the conflict (ibid. 14). 
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One interpreted consequence may thus be that the US has taken steps to provide the 
employees of the PSCs and PMCs they hire with a legal cover. It may also be taken 
to suggest that employees and hence the companies hired by the US are considered 
legitimate participants when they work for the US. A less favorable consequence for 
the companies is however that it makes all foreigners with no connection to the given 
conflict mercenaries.  
Not only does this indicate that the US authorities have identified the necessity for a 
clarification of the legal status of PSCs and PMCs operating abroad in order to 
reassure their legitimacy. It may also be interpreted to suggest that the US has taken 
steps to strengthen the legal legitimacy of the companies. The logic of this argument 
is rooted in the notion that the work of modifying the existing national legal 
framework has led it to be more able to grasp the activity of the PSCs and PMCs. The 
US practice of hiring PSCs and PMCs may thus now fall under the appropriate 
procedures deemed important by Føllesdal (2004: 7) in order to obtain legal 
legitimacy. It may also be argued that the steps taken to a certain degree has clarified 
the relationship between the US and the legal responsibility of the companies. This 
suggests that the US national legal frameworks intended to grasp aspects of the 
activity of the PSC and PMC hired by the US are more or less mirroring the norms 
and values discovered in the US society. This has been considered an important 
source of legitimacy (Clark 2005: 4). Another argument supporting that PSCs and 
PMCs may be considered legally legitimate is thus rooted in the notion that especially 
the legislative in the US now considers it necessary that the companies obey the 
regulations and that the behavior of PSCs and PMCs does not breach with 
constitutional regulations.  
These actions taken by the US in wake of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 
Enduring Freedom may be interpreted as an attempt to cover loopholes in the legal 
frameworks that could be identified before 2001. Hence, when approaching the 
question of whether PSCs and PMCs should be considered as legally legitimate in the 
US, the above mentioned laws and modifications of them may be seen as a serious 
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attempt to answering the extensive critique that the regulations post 9/11 2001. This 
may thus also be interpreted to give some support for the hypothesis investigated, 
which suggested that the PSCs and PMCs are legitimate actors. It may however be 
argued that even with the modifications of various legal arrangement, the US have 
still failed to grasp the activity of especially PSCs. The unclear legal consequences of 
the Blackwater shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians in Nisoor Street, Baghdad on 16 
September, 2007 underline this point (BBC Website 2007). Hence, if it is accepted 
that this example is illustrative for how the laws are applying to the PSCs and PMCs 
hired by the US, it may also be considered to weaken the notion that US laws are able 
to grasp the activity of PSCs and PMCs. It may thus be argued that it is less than clear 
that the efforts made by the US to improve legal accountability are effective enough 
to grasp the activity of the companies, which blurs whether the laws can be 
considered a source of legitimacy as legality.  
5.4 The Impact of Public Opinion on Legitimacy   
Commentators have noticed that the implementation of privatizing and outsourcing 
strategies in the US have been surrounded by political consensus. Evidences for this 
are identified in the fact that both Democratic and Republican administrations sought 
to implement these strategies after the end of the Cold War (Kidwell 2003: 28; 
Markusen 2003: 487- 488; Singer 2003: 67). Hence, initially it may be argued that 
the US public has agreed upon the necessity of hiring PSCs and PMCs thus 
suggesting that these companies should be considered as legitimate actors and 
participants in the US security production against outside threats. It may thus be 
argued that the public opinion accepted the role of the companies, because they are 
considered as solving security related problems.  
5.4.1 The Solution to Security Challenges? 
The systemic changes represented by the disappearance of an outside threat such as 
the Soviet Union is often cited to have weakened the public acceptance of the need to 
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spend vast amounts on militaries and other institution participating in security 
production (Moskos et. al: 2). Furthermore, when the Global War On Terror was 
initiated after the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks, the PSCs and PMCs were given 
important supportive roles bringing them within the sphere where the production of 
security against outside threats takes place. Combined with the stretching of US 
military forces globally (NSAG 2006: 1-2), it may be argued that the companies may 
have gotten legitimacy, because the US public sees their involvement as essential in 
order to solve the security challenges faced by the US. This would imply that the 
PSCs and PMCs may be considered legitimate from the conception as problem 
solvers (Føllesdal 2004: 7). 
In relation to this, it is interesting to notice that a survey conducted by The Center for 
a New American Security (CNAS) and the Foreign Policy Magazine (FP), where 
mainly higher ranking ex military personnel were asked, 76% responded positively to 
the claim that private contractors could provide logistical support for US personnel 
without direct military supervision, (CNAS & FP Survey 2008: 7). 11% agreed upon 
the claim that PSCs could protect DOD convoys, 60% agreed upon the claim that 
PSCs could provide security for State Department personnel, and 23% agreed upon 
the claim that PSCs could be used to guard the Baghdad “Green Zone” without direct 
military supervision (ibid). Even though this survey can not claim to be representative 
for the US populace because it is mainly male ex high ranking officers that have been 
asked (ibid. 10), it is interesting to notice that most of the respondents agreed that 
typical in house tasks such as supplies was a safe area to contract out but services 
such as escorting and guarding militaries were not. However, because 60% agreed 
upon the claim that PSCs could provide security for State Department personnel, it 
may be interpreted to suggest that this already existing practice in the US, may be 
considered as more legitimate than guarding of DOD convoys, if approaching it from 
the aspect of problem solving as a kind of legitimacy (Føllesdal 2004: 7) and public 
opinion as a source for it (Tucker & Hendrickson: 2004). 
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The survey undertaken by CNAS & FP (2008) may thus be interpreted to suggest that 
private solutions in supportive roles of warfighting are seen as acceptable in the US. 
Coupling this with belief that public opinion is an important source of legitimacy 
(Tucker & Hendrickson 2004), and problem solving potential (Føllesdal 2004: 7) it 
may thus be argued that especially PMCs are seen as a legitimate solution to US 
security challenges amongst retired male ex high ranking officers. It may also be 
argued that ex militaries have a better understanding of the process of producing 
security, and the challenges related to contracting out services based on own 
experiences. Another interesting finding in the survey, is that only 7% of the 
respondents agreed that creating a cadre of deployable force of civilians would 
increase the functional ability of the US to meet new security challenges (CNAS & 
FP Survey 2008: 8). This may be interpreted to suggest that PSC or PMC 
involvement is not seen as a solution to future security challenges. A point to be 
made here is thus that the plans of creating a civilian based USG force in the US, 
designated to participate in stabilization and reconstruction mission (Department of 
State report 2006) may be considered as having little public legitimacy. The findings 
in the CNAS & FP Survey (2008: 7-8) may thus be interpreted to partly support the 
hypothesis investigated in this chapter. It is also worth noticing that based on the 
findings in the survey PSCs may be considered less legitimate than PMCs as there 
was more support for contracting out military in house services than for contracting 
out security. Hence, it may be argued that the PMCs may be considered as being 
more legitimate than PSCs.  
A core problem that was noticed earlier is however that the above mentioned survey 
included ex military personnel in the US only (CNAS & FP Survey 2008: 9-10). The 
next part of this chapter will draw upon another survey that may be considered as 
being more representative for the US populace in order to investigate legitimacy of 
PSCs and PMCs related to public opinion and its problem solving potential related to 
political costs. 
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5.4.2 Lowering Political Costs and Increasing Legitimacy? 
PSCs and PMCs may obtain legitimacy because they make it possible for the US to 
put fewer soldiers in harms way. Such a view would see itself closely connected to 
the notion that using PSCs and PMCs may lower political costs of going to war 
(Singer 2003: 210). The legitimacy of the PSCs and PMCs may thus be retrieved 
from the public notion that they make it possible for the US to produce security 
without risking the lives of soldiers. It is however also possible to argue that the 
companies may be considered as less legitimate if this involvement is considered a 
breach of the public expectancy that war is a matter for the state, and that employees 
of PSCs and PMCs are motivated by material gain only.  
A study undertaken by Avant & Sigelman (2008) illuminates this. 800 respondents 
were picked randomly and separated into a control group, reading a story focusing on 
growth of the American bureaucracy. The second group read a story concerning US 
soldiers deaths in Iraq, the third group also read this story, but here the dead ones was 
described as PSC employees. The last group read the story similar to the third, but 
with more information concerning PSCs (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 30). 
Subsequently, all respondents answered questions related to the motivation of the 
employees of PSCs and PMCs and the war in Iraq (ibid.). The study uncovered that 
the respondents saw soldiers as more patriotic than PSC employees regardless of 
what group they belonged to. The percentages viewing the PSC employees as 
motivated by material gain never reached above 34% and was discovered with the 
group given background info about the PSCs (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 31). If it is 
taken into account that a central definition of a mercenary is that he or she is 
motivated by material gain when participating in a conflict, it may be argued that the 
results of the survey suggest that PSC employees were considered legitimate. 
Interesting to notice in relation to the question of legitimacy is also the fact that there 
were few differences when the respondents were asked how angry or sad they where 
when assessing the death of a soldier or a PSC employee (Ibid. 32). Differently said, 
the death of a PSC employee and a US soldier sparked similar negative emotions. 
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This may suggest that using PSCs or PMCs does not justify the loss of lives in war. 
Hence, it may be argued that the companies obtain little legitimacy from the 
perspective of solving the problem of lowering political costs of going to war. 
Furthermore, it also seems less evident that US involvement abroad is more justified 
by using PSCs or PMCs instead of the militaries. Hence, it may be a faulty 
assumption that political costs are lowered as a result of using PSCs and PMCs. This 
point is further emphasized by the finding in the survey which uncovered similar 
feelings amongst those who read about deaths of PSC employees and those that did 
not when they assessed how the war was going in Iraq (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 33). 
It may be argued that this weakens the argument suggesting that using PSCs and 
PMCs may be justified because it reduces political costs of war and hence the ability 
to solve this problem. It thus seems less than evident that the findings in the survey 
conducted by Avant & Sigelman (2008: 30-34) support the notion that PSCs and 
PMCs represent a problem solving potential related to political costs. What may be 
interpreted as a source of legitimacy is however that few of the respondents saw the 
employees of PSCs or PMCs as motivated by material gain only (Avant & Sigelman 
2008: 31). Hence, it may be argued that the public may use this to justify the 
involvement of PSCs and PMCs in security production, because they are not 
considered to be “mercenary like” and motivated by money only. It may thus be 
argued that this represent an indication of an “upgrading” of the moral image of PSCs 
and PMCs in the US. When it is taken into account that morality is a norm and a 
source of legitimacy (Clark 2005: 4), PSCs and PMCs in the US may have obtained 
legitimacy from the public. 
As a result of the above findings, PSCs and PMCs may not be considered legitimate 
actors because they do not solve the problem connected to political costs of war or 
conflict. It may thus be suggested that using PSCs and PMCs in order to reduce 
political costs of intervention only partly qualify the companies to be considered as 
holding a problem solving potential. This view supports itself on the notion that that 
the US public believe that the loss of employees of PSCs or PMCs as equally 
negative as the loss of US militaries (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 32). As a result, it may 
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be argued that these findings weaken the hypothesis investigated in this chapter, 
which considered the PSCs and PMCs as legitimate actors. 
5.4.3 Public Compliance or Deliberate Choice? 
The initial hypothesis investigated in this chapter suggested that PSCs and PMCs 
have retrieved their legitimacy in the US due to the practice of using them (Barker 
1990: 31-33; Schreier & Caparini 2005: 83). It may also be argued that this support 
the notion that the companies may be considered legitimate as result of what 
Føllesdal (2004: 7) referred to compliance, thus suggesting that the public don’t care 
about the practice or fails to address it. The findings in the surveys conducted by 
CNAS & FP (2008) and Avant & Sigelman (2008) investigated earlier in this chapter, 
may be interpreted to suggest that when PSCs and PMCs are hired by the US, the 
public do have opinions regarding the subject if asked. This breaches with the view 
suggesting that PSCs and PMCs obtain legitimacy because of public compliance. It 
may of course be argued that because the population in the CNAS & FP (2008) 
survey consisted of ex military higher ranking officers, they may have personal 
experiences with how the PSCs and PMCs function alongside US military forces. 
From this perspective, it may thus be argued that they have more knowledge 
concerning the companies than the average US citizen would. However, it may also 
be argued that this suggest that those within law enforcement, international 
corporations, militaries and various departments in the US who have used a PSC or 
PMC or been trained by them also have some knowledge and experience related to 
these companies. It may thus be asked how many of the public that Føllesdal (2004:7) 
suggests should be apathetic or ignore the use of PSCs and PMCs by the US before it 
can be claimed that legitimacy out of compliance is achieved. What seems like a 
relevant approach to this question is to argue that because the PSCs and PMCs are so 
heavily involved in various areas of security production, a wide array of the public 
has also had experiences with their activities, thus suggesting that this may affect 
their opinion on the practice of using them.  
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What’s even more interesting in this regard is that the US practice of using PSCs in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has become an issue in the Presidential Candidate nomination 
Process amongst the Democrats. Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Barrack Obama, the 
two candidates of the Democrats have positioned themselves rather differently to the 
subject. As Clinton supports a proposal for a law that will ban the use of PSCs in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, her opponent in the nomination process, Obama for his part 
will not rule out a role for PSCs also in the future (Scahill 2008). Hence, it may be 
argued that Clinton does not see the involvement of PSCs as legitimate in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Another interesting point is that their Republican opponent, 
John McCain for his part has praised the job Blackwater has done in Iraq, although 
not officially taken a stand in the question of whether the extensive use of PSCs 
should continue if he is elected President (Roston 2008).  
This may be interpreted to suggest that the public in the US may be inclined to take 
an opinion concerning the US use of PSCs and PMCs more broadly because being 
supportive for this practice, or not may contribute to who you support politically. It 
may also be argued that Clinton has taken this view because she thinks her potential 
voters dislike the US practice of using PSCs and PMCs abroad. In relation to this, 
Isenberg (2008) notices how “This looks like an attempt to outflank Obama on the 
left and pick up the support of those, […] who consider PMCs as mercenaries”. 
Another suggestion would be that there are enough voters in the US that have 
expressed worries concerning the practice of hiring these companies that it is seen as 
an interesting matter for the politicians. If this is true, it may also be argued that the 
US public is not complying with the US practice of using PSCs and PMCs as a part 
of military operations. From these points of view it may be argued that it represents a 
breach with the behavior that is needed if legitimacy as compliance is to be obtained, 
that following Føllesdal (2004: 7) occurs as a result of  public passiveness or lack of 
caring.  
Hence, this thesis will argue that PSCs and PMCs hired by the US can not be 
considered legitimate as a result of compliance, because matters concerning the use 
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of them have become an issue in the Presidential election, and have already become 
an issue separating the two Democratic Presidential candidate nominees. As a result 
of this it may also be argued that the practice of using PSCs has become an issue with 
politically laden connotations. Even though it may also be argued that not everybody 
care about this issue, as other issues may be considered more important, it may also 
be suggested that it may create a stronger public awareness concerning the practice of 
using PSCs performing security related tasks. This may suggest that the public in the 
US may have a possibility to affect the US future practice of using these companies. 
In turn, this may be interpreted to suggest that the public may be more motivated to 
take a stand concerning this issue. The consequence of the findings above related to 
legitimacy as compliance may thus be interpreted to weaken the hypothesis 
investigated in this chapter, who suggested that the involvement of PSCs and PMCs 
are legitimate actors in the US security production.  
5.4.4  Summary 
The investigation in this chapter has found that international legal frameworks are not 
able to grasp the activities of the US use of PSCs and PMCs abroad. It has also been 
established that national legal frameworks in the US have proven insufficient to grasp 
the activity of PSCs and PMCs when used by the US abroad. The attempts by the US 
to modify existing laws and regulation concerning PSCs and PMCs when used in 
military operations will be interpreted to suggest that they can be considered legally 
legitimate in the US. Other central findings in this chapter are concerned with US 
public opinion. This thesis will, based on the findings in this chapter suggest that it is 
not evident that PSCs and PMCs are considered legitimate actors by the US public. 
Overall, it may thus be questioned whether the companies can be considered 
legitimate actors in the US from the perspective of the public and this weakens the 
hypothesis investigated in this chapter.  
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6. Signs of Political Control in the US? 
6.1 Introduction 
Being able to exercise political control over those that have been given permission to 
exercise violence on behalf of the state is considered a central aspect of the ability to 
monopolize legitimate force (Thomson 1994: 9). Indeed, failing at exercising 
political control suggests that there exists a competing structure exercising violence 
within the US territory. Not only would this suggest that PSCs and PMCs should be 
interpreted as threatening the monopoly of legitimate violence held by the US. From 
the perspective of Rotberg (2004: 4-6), it would also suggest that the US could no 
longer claim to be a strong state. The extensive role the PSCs and PMCs are playing 
in the US production of security may thus be interpreted to represent a great 
challenge if it avoids political control. In order to be able to illuminate the 
overarching research question, this chapter will investigate if the US has the ability to 
exercise control over the PSCs and PMCs along the three dimension forwarded by 
Avant (2005: 40-43) elaborated in the theory chapter. The starting point in this 
chapter is the earlier formulated hypothesis stating that: The US has the ability to 
exercise political control over the PMCs and PSCs they hire and therefore the US 
monopoly on legitimate violence is not threatened.   
6.2 Structure of chapter 
The first part will investigate political control of the PSCs and PMCs along Avant’s 
(2005: 41) functional dimension. In order to do this the investigation will focus on 
whether a functional market exists, the strategies and policies concerning the use of 
PSCs and PMCs and contractual arrangements as a tool to control the costs. The 
second part will apply Avant’s (2005: 42) political dimension of political control and 
examine if the extensive use of PSCs and PMCs has led to a redistribution of power 
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within the processes of decision making related to security in the US. The third part 
will explore the dimension of social control (Avant 2005: 43). The investigation will 
focus on whether the PSCs and PMCs are adhering to norms and values held by the 
traditional institutions in the US.  
6.3 The Functional Dimension of Political Control 
6.3.1 The Importance of a Functional Market to Improve Political 
Control  
In order to avoid agency problems, the process of selecting agents is important 
(Rasch 2000: 74). This thesis will thus argue that a functional market is important 
because it provides the US with the possibility to select between a wider array of 
PSCs and PMCs which again may diminish the danger of negative agency behavior. 
The focus on competitive outsourcing has also been emphasized by Georg W. Bush 
as a way to “promote(s) innovation, efficiency, and greater effectiveness” (Kidwell 
2003: 40). Hence, it can be argued that it is important to stimulate the creation of a 
functional market, because it will create an incentive for the PSCs and PMCs to 
deliver products that are most beneficial for the US needs. Indeed, “true and sustained 
competition” can thus be considered important not only in itself (Markusen 2003: 
477). It has however been noticed that ”collusion among bidders is a real danger, 
because incentive structure of competitive bids is designed to benefit the contractee at 
the expense of the bidders” (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 100). Failing at creating a 
functional market may thus be assessed to play an important role in relation to the 
ability of the US to exercise political control as it is understood by the functional 
dimension outlined by Avant (2004: 43). Such a view support itself on the view that 
resources are an important part of functional control (ibid.). 
As a result of the end of the Cold War, a globally identifiable market consisting of 
PSCs and PMCs occurred from the early 1990s (Singer 2003: 73, 83). The US has 
however chosen to hire almost exclusively amongst domestic PSCs and PMCs 
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although this changed after 2001 (Avant 2005: 130). Furthermore, it is less than 
evident that the US has stimulated for the establishing of a functional domestic 
market of PSCs and PMCs. For example Markusen (2003: 478) discovered in her 
investigation of the defense sector procurement more generally that little if any real 
competition existed. Indeed, the fact that of 3061 signed contracts by Pentagon from 
1994-2002, two companies, the KBR and Booz Allen Hamilton was awarded 2000 of 
them may be taken to illustrate this point (Wulf 2005: 187). The consequence of 
failing to choose PSCs and PMCs from a well functioning market may thus suggest 
that the US may not get the best provider both when it comes to functionality but also 
when it comes to the potential for economic savings. A closer look at selected US 
institutions in 2006, involved in security production against outside threats illustrates 
the practice of ignoring the market. For example Department of Homeland Security, 
where L-3 Communication was the eight largest contractor, did in Fiscal Year 2006 
only award 18.1% of its contracts with full open competition. Furthermore, as shown 
in figure 1, $5,866,066,183 worth of contracts was awarded without competition7.  
 
Figure 1: Department of Homeland Security: Oversight over competition 2006. 
Source: Fedspending.org 
                                              
7 http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/fpds.php?datype=T&detail=-1&database=fpds&fiscal_year=2006&maj_agency_cat=70 
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DOD for its part, where KBR is the sixth largest contracted company, awarded 34.4% 
with full open competition. As illustrated by figure 2, $79,416,026,058 worth of 
contracts was not competed for8.  
 
Figure 2: Department of Defense: Overview of Competition 2006.  
Source: Fedspedning.org 
 
It is also interesting to notice that other agencies that are known to make use of PSCs 
and PMCs seem to have followed a similar policy. Department of State, which has 
hired well known PSCs such as DynCorp (owned by Veritas Capital), Triple Canopy 
and Blackwater Security, awarded 30.3% of its contracts with full open competition. 
Figure 3 does however illustrate that $1,513,089,153 worth of contracts was awarded 
by the Department of State without any competition9.  
                                              
8 http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/fpds.php?datype=T&detail=-1&database=fpds&fiscal_year=2006&maj_agency_cat=97 
9 http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/fpds.php?datype=T&detail=-1&database=fpds&fiscal_year=2006&maj_agency_cat=19 
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Figure 3:  Department of State: Oversight of Competition 2006.  
Source: Fedspending.org 
Defenders of practicing non competitive bidding emphasize that urgent needs 
sometimes makes it impossible to undertake a full bidding round. From the aspect of 
functional ability to deploy force, it may be a relevant argument as urgent needs and 
the ability of selected PSCs and PMCs to respond quick may be taken as a sign that 
the functional ability of the US is improved. From the perspective of agency theory, it 
may however be argued that failures to stimulate to existence of a functional market 
may be considered to increase the possibility for negative agency behavior. 
Furthermore, it may also be argued that only very few PSCs or PMCs have the 
capacity that is needed available. One possible consequence is that the US will not be 
able to establish what Rasch (2000: 74) refers to as ex ante oversight. This suggest 
that the US will not have access to potential bidders for contracts which again makes 
it more difficult to choose the most suitable or best priced contract offer. An issue 
that may be considered both as a problem and an explanation in relation to this is the 
characteristic of the product sold by PSCs and PMCs. It has been noticed that the 
services sold by these companies represent a niche product which suggest that they 
are not many enough to constitute a free market (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 51). 
Regardless of whether this should be considered as a defense or an explanation for 
why the different US institutions has chosen their practice of not stimulating to more 
competition, it may be considered to affect the US ability to exercise functional 
control as it has been  outlined  by Avant (2005: 40). Indeed, the lack of perfect 
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competition makes the process of awarding a potential follow up contract even more 
complicated (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 53). It will here be argued that if it is 
accepted that the market of services provided by PSCs and PMCs is not functional, it 
also makes the companies more prone to provide asymmetrical information for 
example regarding costs or standards, because those hiring have few potential 
companies to choose from. Problems related to what has been described by Rasch 
(2000: 71) as asymmetrical information may thus occur. 
A direct consequence of failures to establish a functional market related to the 
functional dimension of political control may thus be that functional ability to deploy 
force is negatively affected because the US can not choose amongst the best 
providers. Furthermore, lack of a functional market also suggests that the US may not 
be able to choose amongst those companies that are able to combine price and 
functionality. This thesis will argue that the US has failed to stimulate competition 
and a functional market, which should be considered to affect the ability of the US to 
exercise political control on the functional dimension. It will thus be argued that this 
weakens the hypothesis investigated in this chapter which suggested that the US is 
able to exercise political control over their PSCs and PMCs. 
6.3.2 Contract as a Tool to Exercise Political Control  
Holmqvist (2005: 28) notices that holding PSCs and PMCs accountable by contract is 
difficult. This view roots itself on the belief that trust is an important part of 
contractual arrangements. Rasch (2000: 74-75) emphasizes how the contractual 
arrangement is created and whether it creates incentive structures for the agent to 
fulfill its contractual commitments are of great importance for solving agency 
problems. Indeed, the very ability to monitor costs, quality and performance is 
perceived as a yardstick for whether outsourcing is successful (Markusen 2003: 479). 
Hence, when the hypothesis investigated and the approach of Avant (2005: 43) who 
suggested that functional control is connected to both ability to deploy and efficiency, 
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it should be expected that the contracts awarded are formulated in a way making 
functionality combined with efficiency most probable.  
Traditionally, the US has applied two main practices when contracts concerning 
PSCs and PMCs have been awarded. The first approach has been to apply sealed-
bidding, which is expected to ensure fair and reasonable price from the lowest bidder 
(Berrios 2006: 120). The second, the negotiated contract, suggests that the US will 
choose to negotiate a contract selecting amongst those providers it sees fit to answer 
to the given demand (Berrios 2006: 121). Furthermore, the US has also applied “fixed 
price” and “cost –reimbursement” contracts. Within the latter, the “cost plus” type of 
contract is located. The first kind of contract implies that the risk of economic loss is 
placed with the contractor. The second kind, places this risk of loss with the US 
government (Ibid. 121). When it is taken into account that a contract is supposed to 
create structures of incentives that maximizes the utility of both the principal and 
agent (Rasch 2000: 75), it may be questioned how effective the US practice of cost – 
plus contracts are. This view support itself on the notion that cost plus contracts 
places potential economic loss with the US and not the contracted company. Hence, it 
may be argued that this practice weakens US ability to exercise political control 
because cost-plus contracts breach with the notion that the contract provides 
incentives for the PSC or PMC to operate within given limits. 
When it is taken into account that Avant (2005: 43) emphasizes efficiency with 
economic connotations as a part of the functional dimension of political control of 
force, it can be argued that the practice of awarding them challenges the ability of the 
US to exercise political control. 
This point is underlined by the wide array of contracts awarded by the US after 9/11 
2001 to PSCs and PMCs identified as “cost plus” type. For example Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) led by Paul Bremer in Iraq awarded 10 contracts of the 
“cost plus, indefinite delivery/ indefinite quantity” kind with a value of $5,1billion to 
one single contractor in 2003 (Kidwell 2003: 42). Furthermore, a very good 
illustration of the negative consequences of awarding cost plus contracts is 
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discovered when the LOGCAP contract worth $8.6billion awarded to KBR in 2003 is 
investigated. In relation to this contract, $813 million in questioned costs and $382 
million in unsupported costs has later been identified (Berrios 2006: 126). Hence, 
applying cost plus contracts can be considered to weaken economic efficiency and 
thus also political control.  
It may also be argued that cost plus contracts may lead the PSCs and PMCs to be 
more inclined to provide asymmetrical information that support rise in costs related to 
the given cost-plus contract. Such a view finds support in the characteristics of cost-
plus contracts offering the freedom to the agent of cost overrunning (Berrios 2006: 
127).  It can thus be argued that imperfect information provided by the given PSC or 
PMC contracted, makes opportunistic and exploitive behavior, such as disguise of 
costs and quality, more possible (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 99).  Indeed it may be 
argued that the cost plus contracts increase the probability for negative agent 
behavior because the process of estimating costs is left partly with the contracted. The 
example of US based PSC Custer Battles which was awarded several large contracts 
in post war Iraq is a good illustration of the potential for negative agency behavior. 
The PSC charged the US authorities for $157,000 for the building of a helicopter pad, 
which it hired subcontractor to do for $95,000 (Eckholm 2004). Furthermore, Custer 
Battles was later also accused of billing for the provision of a security detail that was 
to guard a convoy which it failed to deliver (ibid.). It may thus be argued that the 
existence of asymmetrical information and hidden actions as it has been outlined by 
Rasch (2000: 71-72) can be identified in the above example. Hence, this example 
helps to illuminate that the US practice of hiring PSCs and PMCs leads to problems 
and challenges that are grasped well with agency theory.  
However, the functional dimension of political control is not only about efficiency 
with economic connotations, but also closely associated with how contracting out 
affects the US functional ability to deploy force (Avant 2005: 41, 43). Hence, an 
aspect of the practice of awarding cost plus contracts is that it is often done in order 
to cover “urgent needs” (Berrios 2006: 126). This may be considered to imply more 
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functional ability because the US is able to respond quicker and with more flexibility 
to new security threats. It will here be suggested that this puts higher demands on the 
US ability to exercise oversight over their contractual relationships with the PSCs and 
PMCs. Contracting out as result of urgent needs may make it difficult for the US to 
exercise what Rasch (2000: 75) calls ex ante oversight over the potential candidates. 
One example of this is the contracting out of security at the CIA station in Kabul, 
Afghanistan in 2002. One argument forwarded for why Blackwater was awarded the 
contract was simply put that they were considered the only ones able to leave for 
Afghanistan on a short notice (Scahill 2007: 45). Contractual arrangements such as 
the cost plus type may thus be considered preferable from a functional aspect if the 
ability to deploy force is the only criteria for success. However, because Avant (2005: 
43) couples the functional dimension of political control with efficiency, the practice 
in the US surrounding contractual arrangements and PSCs and PMCs may be 
considered to weaken the hypothesis investigated in this chapter. The identification of 
the various problems identified by agency theory related to contractual arrangements 
between the US and PSCs and PMCs after 9/11 2001 support this view.  
Interesting to notice in regard to the use of contracts is the fact that the US has taken 
steps to address the challenges related to contractual arrangements concerning the 
hiring of PSCs and PMCs. One approach has been to educate and dedicate more 
officers to oversee the contracted PSCs and PMCs in the field. One example of this is 
the “Contractors Accompanying the Force Training Package”, which was offered 
from 2007 to increase the knowledge amongst military officers on how to oversee 
their contractual arrangements with contractors (Contractors Accompanying the 
Force Training Package 2007). This may be seen as improving the system of 
exercising control.  
Rasch (2000: 76) sees the capacity of the principal to address issues concerning the 
agent as one way of counteract potential agency problems. The question thus 
becomes how effective these moves are if the awarding of cost plus contracts 
continues. In relation to this it should be noticed that the US did as a response to 
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allegations of contractual misconduct of Halliburton and Bechtel in Iraq, increase the 
number of contract management officers in the country from the initial 4 in 2003 to 
14 in 2004 (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 100). This may be seen as an important move 
to improve contractual oversight as it has been forwarded as a way of improving 
regulative oversight in the US (Isenberg 2004: 11). It may also be seen as change in 
the trend of downsizing its defence contractor manager force which can be 
considered a weakening of the ability to oversee contracts awarded. This trend started 
in 1997 and until 2002 the US increased the number of contracts with private defense 
contractors from $117.1billion to $167.7billion, but simultaneously downsized their 
force of defence contractor managers from 14353 to 11709 (Schreier & Caparini 
2005: 52).  
To this it should be noticed that many contractual arrangements between various US 
institutions and PSCs or PMCs often lack mechanisms related to both monitoring and 
oversight (Schreier & Caparini 2005: 52). It may thus be argued that it is too early to 
claim that this will improve the ability of the US to counter negative agency behavior. 
Hence, it is also less than clear that contracts, especially the cost plus type, is a proper 
tool for exercising functional control over the PSCs and PMCs. Instead, it will be 
argued that because negative agency behavior seem to be difficult to counter, when 
contracts are investigated, it will also be argued that it is less evident that the US is 
able to exercise political from the functional dimension provided by (Avant 2005: 41, 
43). Hence, this suggests a weakening of the hypothesis investigated in this chapter. 
6.4 The Political Dimension of Political Control 
6.4.1 Shaping the Understanding of the World 
In relation to the political dimension, it is also an interesting approach to argue that 
PSCs and PMCS may be getting undue policy influence because they have gotten an 
increasingly more important role in the provision of intelligence in the US. It has 
been noticed that close to 95% of all intelligence collected by the US today are 
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collected from open sources and a lot of it also comes from PSCs and PMCs (Leander 
2004: 13). Indeed, the US has outsourced a wide array of tasks closely connected to 
collection to intelligence. Examples of this include the involvement Space Imaging 
and Digital Globe in Afghanistan and the AEGIS contract to provide both security 
and intelligence for the US Army Corps of Engineers in Iraq (ibid.). It may thus be 
argued that this development favors the PSCs and PMCs because they may exercise 
influence over the process where security policy is formulated more directly. This 
may be done either by providing data or by interpretation of them (Leander 2004: 
14). According to agency theory, the PSC or PMC given the task of providing 
intelligence may use it as an opportunity to emphasize its own interests. For one it 
may hold back relevant information that may disfavor them, thus suggesting that 
“hidden knowledge” or “hidden information”, two aspects of asymmetrical 
information is possible (Rasch 2000: 71). If it is accepted that PSCs and PMCs are 
profit driven entities, and hence have a priori different interests than the US, they can 
use provision of intelligence in order to affect policies in the US to favor their future 
position. This should be seen in relation to the notion that intelligence plays a very 
important role as identifying threats and the making of decisions related to strategy 
and security (Leander 2004: 13). It may thus be argued that the PMCs and PSCs have 
been able to position themselves in a role where they have gotten access to a direct 
route to exercising influence on political decisions. It is however also possible to 
argue that collection and misinterpretation of intelligence by PSCs or PMCs may also 
lead to incidents that can have political consequences. Examples of this include the 
downing of a Peruvian civilian airplane and the bombing of Colombian civilians 
based on intelligence provided by US based PMCs in 2001 (Leander 2004: 14). 
Although it can be argued that state based intelligence also could have caused these 
mistakes, it may be suggested that privately based intelligence may be suspected to 
serve the interests of the companies. 
Involving PSCs and PMCs as the US has done several times, may thus be said to 
have introduced a new actor into the policy decision process closely related to the 
deployment of force. Furthermore, it may also be argued that this practice has direct 
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implications on the policy making decisions because it creates more (but perhaps not 
better) sources of intelligence for those making the given decision in the US. This 
view roots itself on agency theory which assumes that agents will often have 
diverging interests from the principal per se (Rasch 2000: 71). Privatization and 
outsourcing of intelligence related services may therefore be considered to have 
introduced a way where PSCs and PMCs can affect the political decision making 
process by more direct access to political decision makers. It can be argued that this 
weaken the ability of the US to exercise political control over the PSCs and PMCs. 
This view supports itself on the interpretation that it represents a redistribution of 
power between political decision makers and state institutions involved in security 
production versus the companies.  
Another trait of PSCs and PMCs in the US is that they are eager to be considered as 
security experts. Leander (2004: 16) suggests that when these companies are able to 
maneuver themselves into the position as experts in security, they may also be able to 
take the debate of public security out of the public realm and into the private one. 
Such a development implies that the PSCs and PMCs have the potential of affecting 
the political debate surrounding concerns and issues connected to the deployment of 
force. By acting as experts, the companies may become more privileged as they may 
be able to give themselves a new and more important role in the process of producing 
security. Again, it is possible to draw upon agency theory and argue that occurrence 
of asymmetrical information may be likely, because the PSCs and PMCs per se may 
be considered to have diverging interests from the US. One consequence of this is 
that the role of the US Congress may become deprivileged (Leander 2004: 16). This 
view roots itself on the notion that if PSCs and PMCs are considered security experts 
by the Administration and the public more generally thus adding credibility to 
decisions made by the Administration. Posing as security experts may thus be 
considered to make the companies more able to exercise influence that will take care 
of their own goals. 
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The role PMCs and PSCs have come to play in for example the development of 
military doctrine via its involvement in Joint Warfighting Assessment Center and 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in developing future concepts 
for warfighting (Leander 2004: 17), may be taken to illustrate the role of PSCs and 
PMCs as security experts.  Also the contracting out of the writing of a report that was 
to assess how PMCs could be put to better use by the US in relation to supplying 
troops, which was awarded to well known PMSC Brown & Root in 1992 (Singer 
2003: 142), may be interpreted to illustrate this. It may thus be argued that PSCs and 
PMCs to a certain degree have maneuvered to become an alternative actor where 
considerations concerning security production are undertaken. If the argument by 
Leander (2004: 16) suggesting that the role of the US Congress becomes 
deprivileged, it may thus also be argued that there is an inhibit danger that the PSCs 
and PMCs can pose and act as security experts unchecked. This may be interpreted to 
suggest that what Avant (2005: 43) described as a displacement of power has 
occurred. From the perspective of the political dimension of political control, the 
ability PSCs and PMCs have to shape the understanding of aspects related to security 
production represents a serious challenge to the US ability to exercise political 
control over these industries. Such a view roots itself on the notion that “shift in the 
power of different actors over the control of force” is deemed important in relation to 
the ability to exercise political control over force (Avant 2005: 42). This may be 
interpreted to suggest that a shift in power between legislative on the one hand, and 
executives and the companies on the other may be identified. Hence, a related 
consequence of this suggests that the hypothesis investigated in this chapter is 
seriously challenged by these findings. 
It should also be noticed that for example in 2001, PMCs spent $44million on 
lobbying and political campaign donations (Isenberg 2004: 40). Indeed, one example 
of this is Crowell & Moring. This law firm has been hired by for example 
Blackwater, Erinys LLC. Triple Canopy and DynCorp International Inc to monitor 
and provide legal justification of the involvement of these companies in Iraq (Eviatar 
2007). It has also been noticed that in 2001, 95% of political donations by 
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Halliburton were given to Republicans. The very same year, Republicans got 72% of 
the political donations from by DynCorp (Isenberg 2004: 40). This illustrate that 
PSCs and PMCs in the US can draw upon many resources that may be interpreted as 
making them able to exercise influence on the legislative and executive branches in 
the US. Hence it may be argued that they have the potential to exercise influence on 
recruiting and selection mechanisms and other processes that may affect the use of 
PSCs and PMCs in the future. From the perspective of agency theory, it may thus be 
argued that the combination of personal links, lobbying and political donations 
represent a battery of possible combinations where PSCs and PMCs can exercise 
influence via new access points. It may thus be argued that this represent a 
redistribution of power that negatively affect the ability of the US to exercise political 
control. Furthermore, it can be suggested that the findings so far weaken the 
hypothesis investigated in this chapter. 
6.4.2 Affecting Democratic Transparency 
Another issue related to the political dimension, is whether using PSCs and PMCs 
has affected the transparency that surrounds the use of force. Civilian oversight over 
those performing violence on behalf of the state should be considered an important 
mechanism in strong democratic states. Hence, a change here, suggesting that the 
possibility to exercise this oversight is weakened may also be interpreted to suggest 
that the ability to exercise political control is weakened. Such a view roots itself on 
the notion that a change in the ability to get information and oversight suggest a shift 
in power between the PSCs and PMCs and the public, especially legislative part of 
the US.  
6.4.3 Congress’ Ability to Oversee 
Initially it has been noticed that the executive branch is gaining most when the US is 
contracting out. This view roots itself on Avant & Sigelman (2008: 15), who argue 
that because it is the executive branch in the US that is handling the process of 
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outsourcing to the PSCs and PMCs, it leads to a situation where they have the 
information and oversight concerning contractual arrangements. Indeed, the wide 
array of tools that provide the Congress with the ability to exercise oversight over 
militaries, such as restricting funding, setting vetting criteria’s for soldiers and its role 
as consultative organ when US militaries are deployed to war zones is more or less 
absent when PSCs and PMCs are considered (Avant & Sigelman 2008:  15-16). Not 
only does this suggest an undue displacement of power within the US, but it also 
suggests that the transparency surrounding the use of US militaries is not present 
when PSCs and PMCs are contracted. Hence, this may be interpreted to suggest a 
weakening of the hypothesis investigated in this chapter. This view is supported by 
the notion that there is no obligation for the Executive branch in the US to inform the 
Congress what PSC or PMC it contracts to train foreign militaries (Avant & Sigelman 
2008: 17). Furthermore, the Congress only needs to be noticed if contracts 
concerning sale of military training services to foreign governments exceed 
$50million (ibid.). Perhaps the most central point when transparency is investigated 
in relation to the political dimension, is however that it is the executive branch in the 
US that hires PSCs and PMCs and not the Congress (Avant 2008: 15). Leander 
(2004: 16) notices that this leads the debate concerning security away from Congress, 
“into a restricted realm where the executive, the military, the secret services and 
PMCs can decide how issues should be defined and handled”. 
Based on this, it may thus be argued that transparency surrounding the use of PSCs 
and PMCs is seriously challenged as a result of the above mentioned characteristics 
of the contracting out process. There are however signs that the Congress are about to 
address some of the challenges related to the lack of transparency. Three examples of 
new legislation illustrate this. The S.674 (Obama) – Transparency and Accountability 
in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007, does for example require 
Secretaries of Defense, State, Interior, the Administrator of the USAID, and the 
Director of National Intelligence to provide information concerning the contractors 
and subcontractors working in Afghanistan and Iraq within 90 days of enactment 
(Elsea & Serafino Report 2007:  27). Furthermore, the H.R. 897, Iraq and 
 90 
Afghanistan Sunshine Act requires that Secretaries of State, Defense, the Interior and 
the administrator of the USAID should provide Congress with copies of contracts and 
tasks that value more than $5million (Elsea & Serafino 2007: 29). And thirdly, the 
H.Res 97 (Murphy, Patrick) established that DOD Inspector General and the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction must report to the Congress concerning the 
costs related to military and reconstruction funding (Elsea & Serafino 2007: 30). It 
may however be argued that it is premature to suggest that these steps will increase 
transparency.  
Avant & Sigelman (2008: 19) suggest that the US Congress is satisfied with an 
approach to the issue identified as post hoc analysis, sometimes recognized by a “fire 
alarm” oversight, making it possible to avoid involvement in policy shaping. The 
above mentioned acts and resolutions forwarded by the Congress may however also 
be interpreted to suggest that it is indeed trying to bring itself back in. It has however 
also been argued that despite of efforts to increase transparency and oversight, even if 
improved, the Congressional oversight over PSCs and PMCs is rather miserable 
compared to the one they have over the use of US militaries (Avant & Sigelman 
2008: 16). Not only does this underline that PSCs and PMCs may be considered a 
new important actor within the security producing sphere. The lack of transparency 
may thus be taken to represent a great challenge to the notion that any form of 
democratic control over the PSCs and PMCs is effective, thus suggesting a 
weakening of ability to exercise political control. Such a view roots itself on the 
notion that lack of transparency suggests a change in the relationship between the 
Congress and Administration in the US, disproportionately favoring the 
Administration. This may thus be interpreted to represent a serious challenge to the 
hypothesis investigated in this chapter. 
6.4.4 Consequences for Public Transparency 
This thesis will continue by arguing that transparency is not only a matter of whether 
the legislative branch in the US is able to exercise its role as a check and balance 
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upon the executive. It will also be assumed that the public in the US is important 
here, because the legitimacy of the executive and legislative branches in the US is 
firmly rooted within the public opinion (Tucker & Hendrickson 2004).Thus, it may 
also be argued that if the public have little knowledge or ability to obtain knowledge 
related to the US practice of hiring PSCs and PMCs, they may not be able to take it 
into consideration on Election Day or addressing concerns to their elected 
representatives. Hence, transparency also concerns the public level in the US, and 
may be considered as weakened if information is hard to get (Avant & Sigelman 
2008: 20). Signs that the transparency towards the public is suffering when PSCs and 
PMCs are hired by the US are illustrated by the notion that the practice may avoid 
institutional mechanisms such as the Freedom of Information Act. Another issue is 
the notion that PSCs and PMCs limit information about their operations, clients and 
contracts due to proprietary terms (Avant & Sigelman 2008:  20-21). The 
consequences may thus be that the public do not have access to information 
considering costs related to the US hiring of PSCs and PMCs. When it is taken into 
account that Avant (2005: 43) considers the cost aspect as important when the 
political dimension of political control is considered, it may be argued lack of 
transparency concerning contractual arrangements represents a great challenge to 
political control. Lack of transparency also makes it easier for the executive in the US 
to deploy force below the public radar, which should be considered as a change from 
the traditional deployment of force using military forces. Hence, it may be argued 
that a displacement of power, favoring the executive and the companies has also 
occurred here. Such a view roots itself on Avant’s (2005: 43) understanding of the 
political dimension of political control. Initially this may be taken to support the 
notion that using PSCs and PMCs reduces transparency, which in turn challenges the 
hypothesis investigated in this chapter. Hence, it may be argued that this lack of 
transparency complicates the ability of the public to assess what the PSCs and PMCs 
do, which again may be interpreted to suggest the power of the public is weakened 
versus the companies and the executive branch. Such a view roots itself on the 
argument considering transparency identified in the Freedom of Information Act to 
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be an important asset of the political system in the US. The PSCs and PMCs may thus 
be considered to represent what Avant (2005: 42) described as a shift in power.  
It has also been found that PSCs and PMCs get less cover in the media than the 
conventional US military forces do (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 21). By comparing the 
New York Post and the Saint –Louis Post Dispatch between 2003 and 2007, Avant & 
Sigelman (2008: 25-27) discovered that media coverage of PSCs and PMCs was 
almost absent in both newspapers in the four year period investigated. In the New 
York Times, second quarter of 2004, the peak of attention concerning PSCs and 
PMCs was identified. This came as result of the killings of the four Blackwater 
Employees in Fallujah in 2004, (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 25). Compared with 
numbers of articles dedicated to the US military, the same period, the 95 articles 
covering PSCs and PMCs was modest compared to the 1249 articles covering US 
militaries. In the Saint Louis Post Dispatch, 14 articles covering the PSCs and PMCs 
were discovered in the same quarter, compared to 238 related to US militaries (Avant 
& Sigelman 2008: 27).  Overall, between 2003 and 2007, coverage of PSCs and 
PMCs versus US militaries was 1/27 and 1/47 in the Saint Louis Post Dispatch and 
the New York Times. Hence, this may be taken to support the notion that the public 
may get little access to information concerning what hat the PSCs and PMCs are 
doing. Worth noticing in relation to this is the notion that when information 
concerning the companies is publicly available it is often considered “more diffuse” 
and “harder to amass” than the one concerning militaries (Avant & Sigelman 2008: 
20). It may of course be argued that two newspapers are not enough to draw 
conclusions but this thesis will never the less argue that it is useful for illustrating the 
point concerning media coverage.  
It may thus be argued that there are several obstacles related to the ability of US 
citizens to collect information that makes it possible for them to make a sound 
assessment of potential problems and even misbehavior conducted by the PSCs and 
PMCs. As a result, it may be argued that this represents a weakening of the public’s 
ability to address problems via their elected representatives. The lack of transparency 
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thus suggests a great challenge to the practice of allowing for public oversight via the 
Freedom of Information Act, into most security related issues (Avant & Sigelman 
2008: 20). Hence, it may thus be argued that hiring PSCs and PMCs have the undue 
negative consequence in the US of making the position of both the public and the 
legislative disadvantaged related to the executive and the companies when 
transparency is measured.  
Taking Avant’s (2005: 42) political dimension of political control into consideration 
here suggests a serious weakening of the ability for the US to exercise political 
control over the PSCs and PMCs and a weakening of the hypothesis investigated in 
this chapter.  
6.5 The Social Dimension of Political Control  
According to Avant (2005: 42), who focuses on militaries in western states, including 
the US, societal norms and values such as respect for democratic principles, less use 
of force and respect for human rights and laws of war are important today. PSCs and 
PMCs may not automatically be expected to abide to these norms and values as they 
are private profit driven entities suggesting that thriving for new contracts may be 
considered most important. Failing to adhere to the norms and values accepted as 
important in the US would thus imply a weakening of political control from the 
perspective of the social dimension. 
Initially it should be noticed that US based PSCs and PMCs are expected to adhere to 
the values held by their public counterparts (Avant 2005: 156). Defence of this view 
is discovered in the fact that these companies often rely on employees which have a 
background within US militaries or other institutions. Illustrative for this is US PMC, 
MPRI, which has bragged that they had more four stars generals per square feet than 
the Pentagon (Singer 2003: 119). PSC Blackwater founded by a US Navy SEAL and 
mainly staffed with ex elite military personnel and ex law officers is another example 
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here (Blackwater Website)10. Hence, if it is accepted that former military or law 
enforcement personnel bring their values with them, it seems plausible to support the 
notion that PSCs and PMCs adhere to values or norms. Another point in this regard is 
the notion that the PSCs and PMCs in the US often have an outspoken reference to 
“military professional values in their plans, advertisements and decisions“ (Avant 
2005: 157). Furthermore, some PSCs and PMCs have been used to spread US values 
abroad. MPRI which have trained several foreign armies either on behalf of, or with 
the blessing of the US, underline this (ibid. 155). This may be considered to underline 
that US based PSCs and PMCs are bearers of values important in the US. 
In relation to this, the US approach of considering the companies as a possibility and 
not a threat may strengthen the motivation for them to adhere to values and norms in 
order to increase the possibility for being awarded the next contract. A starting point 
is therefore to suggest that the PSCs and PMCs have adhered to values important in 
the US, thus suggesting political control along the social dimension. This may thus be 
interpreted to support the hypothesis investigated. 
From the perspective of agency theory however, PSCs and PMCs can not be expected 
to have interests equal to the US. It may thus be expected that the companies will do 
everything possible to pose as being concerned with adhering to norms and values 
seen as important in the US as a result of strategic thinking. These views support 
themselves on Rasch (2000: 71) who suggest that the agent will have incentives to 
hide its preferences for the principal. Hence, it may be questioned whether the 
companies are attending to little more than window dressing in order to be awarded 
the next contract. 
There are several reasons for why this may be a valid suggestion. The situation that 
occurred especially after the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a huge demand 
                                              
10 http://www.blackwaterusa.com/human_resources/HMR_Recruit_personel.html 
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for both PSCs and PMCs. Several consequences that may have affected the 
companies’ conformity of US values and norms can be identified. Firstly, increased 
demand for services provided by PSCs, such as site and convoy security made it more 
difficult to find experienced manpower in the US. This made some PSCs to start 
recruiting Third Country Nationals (TNCs) from the African continent (UNIRIF 
2008). US based PSCs working in Iraq are also known to hire amongst Kurds, Iraqis 
and South Africans (GAO 2006: 5). One consequence has thus been that ex militaries 
with connections to former regimes well known for use of torture and other breaches 
of for example human rights were hired by US based PSCs to fill the manpower gaps. 
When it is taken into account that professional military background has been 
emphasized as important for what kind of values the PSCs or PMCs are bearers of, it 
will be argued that the practice mentioned above blurs the notion that all PSCs or 
PMCs adhere to norms and values held important in the US. From an agency theory 
perspective, the companies hiring ex militaries with a fuzzy past, may be inclined to 
deny or cover this up for strategic reasons.  
The view that PSCs and PMCs are bearers of military professional values as a result 
of the background of their employees becomes even fuzzier when the vetting process 
of them is taken into account. For example regarding the PSCs and PMCs operating 
in Iraq, it has been noticed that the companies have few possibilities to uncover 
criminal backgrounds on employees regardless of them being US citizens, other 
Western nationals, Kurds or Iraqis (GAO 2006: 12-13). From an agency theory 
perspective of hidden knowledge, it can be expected that the companies may claim 
that they have acted within due diligence in the vetting process, even though their 
motive for profit may have been the reason for hiring TNCs or others with blurry 
pasts. Another aspect of this is that US based PSCs and PMCs have turned 
increasingly to sub contractors in order to be able to fulfill their contractual 
commitments. This may imply that even if US based PSCs or PMC have adhered to 
norms and values, there is no guarantee that their subcontractors will. From an 
agency theory aspect it may be suspected that PSCs or PMCs relying on 
subcontractors may choose to create an image of their subcontractors as adhering to 
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values important in the US, because agents according to Rasch (2000: 71) will hide 
information from the principal. When it is taken into account that PSCs and PMCs 
are profit driven entities, it may be argued that this practice is part of the overall 
strategy of being awarded new contracts. The worries stated by Elsea & Serafino 
(2007: 25) suggesting that increased demand for the products supplied by PSCs and 
PMCs may affect the quality of the companies’ employees related to professionalism 
and discipline should thus not be ignored. 
Hidden actions or knowledge, identified as asymmetrical information by Rasch 
(2000: 71) may be hard to discover. After all, it can be suggested that it would not 
have been hidden if everybody knew. Interesting to notice in this regard is the 
findings of an investigation conducted by Peace Operations Institute (POI), an 
organization started by members of IPOA (POI webpage 2008). The survey asked 
questions concerning services offered, contracting entities, regions of operation, 
employment and finally standard and ethics of PSCs and PMCs (Messner & Gracielli 
2007: 4). 
In relation to the social dimension of political control, the question asked, concerned 
the internal and external standards of the companies are interesting. The answers here 
uncovered low adherence to codes such as Iraqi Theater Rules of Engagement (39%), 
the UN Code of Conduct for law enforcement personnel (22%), and the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (26%) amongst the respondents. Perhaps the most important 
finding for the investigation of the social dimension of political control was that only 
23 out of 334 companies, identified as the target population responded to the survey 
(Messner & Gracielli 2007: 13). According to the report, the lack of will amongst the 
companies asked to participate can be explained by the sensitive nature of the 
question asked (ibid. 12). From an agency theory perspective it may however be 
suggested that the low rate of respondents can be explained by the wish by the PSCs 
and PMCs asked, to hide their preferences concerning attitudes related to codes of 
conduct. A question that asks whether a given company adhere or not to a specific 
code of conduct may indeed be considered to endanger reputation and uncover 
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motives unknown to future potential agents. It is also of interest to notice that even 
when the PSCs and PMCs asked were given guarantees about full anonymity, still 
only 6.10% responded to the survey. From this it may thus be suggested that the 
PSCs and PMCs are likely to adhere to agency behavior such as asymmetrical 
information. This can be considered to weaken the hypothesis investigated which was 
formulated to suggest that the US is able to exercise political control over PSCs and 
PMCs.  
6.6 Summary 
The findings in this chapter are approached political control from Avant’s (2005: 41-
43) functional, political and social dimensions. Agency theory was used to shed light 
on different aspects of the dimensions. Lack of a functional market combined with 
extensive use of cost plus contracts is in this thesis interpreted to suggest that the US 
have limited their own ability to control economic costs when hiring PSCs and 
PMCs.  Furthermore, it was also discovered that PSCs and PMCs have a wide array 
of possibilities to circumvent traditional pathways of influencing political decision 
makers. The chapter also discovered that it can be questioned whether all US based 
PSCs and PMCs have adhered to norms and values deemed important in the US. 
Taken together, this weakens the hypothesis investigated in this chapter. 
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7. Conclusion 
The overarching goal in this thesis has been to investigate how the use of PSCs and 
PMCs by the US affects its monopoly on legitimate force. Chapter 4 investigated 
how the hiring of PSCs and PMCs by the US affects its functional ability to produce 
security for its citizens. The findings here suggest that the consequences are mixed. 
On the one hand, PSCs and PMCs add both flexibility and easy access to capacity 
and capability that should be considered as having positive effects on the ability of 
the US to produce security for its citizens. However, the chapter also uncovered that 
the US by relying on PMCs and PSCs also jeopardizes its own in house capacity. The 
consequences for the hypothesis, which suggested that PSCs and PMCs hired by the 
US should be regarded to increase the functional ability of the US to produce 
security for its citizens against outside threats and therefore do not threaten the US 
monopoly on legitimate force, are therefore mixed. From a short term perspective, 
hiring PSCs and PMCs can be interpreted to support the hypothesis. From a long 
term perspective however, the hiring of PSCs and PMCs weakens the hypothesis. It 
will thus be argued that the findings suggest that there are both positive and negative 
functional consequences related to whether the companies threaten the US monopoly 
on legitimate force.  
Chapter 5 that investigated whether the PSCs and PMCs should be considered 
legitimate actors also provides mixed evidences. The hypothesis investigated here 
suggested that “The PMCs and PSCs are considered legitimate actors within the 
security sphere in the US, and therefore do not threaten the US monopoly on 
legitimate force”. As the international legal frameworks seems to provide little 
legitimacy as legality for the PSCs and PMCs hired by the US, the findings related to 
the US’ own laws are more mixed. Even though there are obvious flaws and 
weaknesses, the modifications to adjust existing laws will be interpreted to provide 
evidence for some legal legitimacy. The analysis, which focused on the public 
opinion in the US, does however indicate a weakening of the notion that the PSCs 
and PMCs are legitimate, when this is investigated in relation to their problem 
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solving potential. Based on this, it will thus be argued that the hypothesis investigated 
was seriously weakened.  
Chapter 6 that investigated whether the US is able to exercise political control over 
the US based PSCs and PMCs that they hire, also provided mixed findings. The 
hypothesis investigated was formulated as The US has the ability to exercise political 
control over the PMCs and PSCs they hire and therefore the US monopoly on 
legitimate violence is not threatened. Lack of functional control related to costs, 
evidences of a displacement of power, and weak evidences supporting the notion that 
US based PSCs and PMCs adhere to US held values and norms, suggest a serious 
weakening of the hypothesis investigated.  
The findings in the three chapters of analysis affect the research question. The 
analysis in chapter 4 suggest that PSCs and PMCs affect the US held monopoly on 
legitimacy positively from a short term perspective, but also that the long term 
strategy of contracting out in house capacity to these companies have inherent 
negative effects. This suggests that the extensive reliance on these actors, represent a 
challenge to the US held monopoly in the long run. Because the US, via the QDR 
(2006: 16, 87), has given the PSCs and PMCs an important future role in the security 
production against outside threats, this thesis will, based on the findings in chapter 4, 
argue that this represents a great challenge to the monopoly on legitimate force. The 
findings in chapter 5 also represent negative effects on the US held monopoly on 
violence. This view roots itself in the notion that it is less than evident that the US has 
laws that are able to regulate the activity of the PSCs and PMCs when they are used. 
Because the international legal frameworks are unable to cope with the activity of 
these companies, it will also be argued that it blurs the notion that the US practice of 
using them on the international level should be considered legitimate. Using these 
companies thus affect the US held monopoly on legitimate violence negatively. The 
consequences related to political control draw a picture of the PSCs and PMCs as 
actors that are willing to adhere to negative agency behavior on several levels. 
Furthermore, because the US seems unable or unwilling to answer to this by creating 
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mechanisms that can counteract this behavior, it will be argued that the US are only 
partly able to exercise political control over the PSCs and PMCs they hire. Again, 
this suggests that using these companies have negative consequences for the US held 
monopoly on legitimate force. 
This thesis has applied a theoretical framework based on several contributions in 
order to analyse the research question by using secondary sources. Because the 
existence and use of PSCs and PMCs by the US have gotten increased attention 
especially since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, this thesis has been able to choose 
amongst a wide array of secondary sources of both academic and non academic 
character. This has provided a wide array of contributions that have made it possible 
to shed light on various aspects related to the US use of PSCs and PMCs and its 
consequences for the hypotheses investigated. Furthermore, it is not evident that 
primary sources would have provided this thesis with more useful contributions than 
the secondary sources have, because the subject can be considered to be connected to 
strong ideological connotations and secrecy. 
A central point in this thesis regarding the conclusions in the different chapters is that 
they can be considered somewhat interconnected. This has been analytically 
challenging because it has, to some extent, been difficult to know where to separate 
between them. It will be argued that this have some consequences for the robustness 
of the conclusions made in the thesis. The first conclusion concerns functional 
consequences related to the hiring of PSCs and PMCs. These findings are considered 
robust because they support themselves on a wide array of sources that have 
investigated or have first hand experience with the issue. The analysis here supports 
itself on official investigations, but also on acknowledged scholars. The part of the 
analysis investigating the international and national legal legitimacy of the PSCs and 
PMCs is considered the most robust one because it has been a well investigated 
subject. The second conclusion connecting legitimacy to public opinion is considered 
less robust because it relied upon the survey from CNAS & FP (2008), which can not 
be considered representative for the US public. However, the survey conducted by 
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Avant & Sigelman (2008) adds to the robustness when investigating the US public, 
because the respondents here are more representative for the US public overall. The 
last conclusion is considered robust because it is investigated along the three 
dimensions provided by Avant (2005: 41-43), covering a wider aspect of political 
control. The strength of the findings is also rooted in the variety of sources applied. 
This thesis has used a single case. This diminishes the possibilities to generalize. It 
can however be argued that the findings in this study can be drawn upon in order to 
investigate the effects of PSCs and PMCs and their effect on the monopoly on 
legitimate violence in other strong democratic states as well. This view support itself 
on the fact that the US has been a forerunner in allowing for private participation in 
supportive roles in security production. It may thus be argued that other strong states 
that may want to follow a similar pathway can identify potential challenges and 
pitfalls by looking at the US.  
The findings in this thesis may be considered to contribute to the overarching 
discussion of the status and role of the state as a sovereign entity in wars and conflicts 
versus non state actors. The findings largely support those who claim that PSCs and 
PMCs challenge the existence of a Weberian state monopoly on legitimate force. The 
findings can therefore also be considered to undermine some of the foundation of 
those theoretical approaches emphasizing that states are the only relevant actors on 
the international stage. Another proposition is that the findings in this thesis support 
theoretical approaches such as security governance, who emphasizes the importance 
of non state actors in security related questions. This thesis also provides evidences 
indicating that the US has taken steps to answer to some of the challenges using PSCs 
and PMCs represent. The findings in this thesis also underline the importance and 
usefulness of separating between the various companies in order to be able to grasp 
the consequences of hiring them. Overall, this thesis places itself within the 
discussion concerning the role of non state actors and states. Furthermore, this thesis 
can also be placed within the debate concerning whether non state actors should be 
given permission to participate in sovereign tasks or not. These are some, but not the 
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only subjects concerning PSCs and PMCs that should be given attention by future 
research. 
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